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ABSTRACT
This study examines the nature and extent of the income redistributive
impact of government subsidies to mass transit in the United States. To
ascertain the net distributional effect, both the costs and benefits
of transit subsidization are estimated. This involves analyzing the
income characteristics of the users of various types of transit services,
the degree of subsidization of each type of transit, and the different
mixes of tax mechanisms used to finance the subsidies. 0
On the basis of aggregate data for the United States and disaggregate
data for each of the 26 largest American metropolitan areas, it is estimated
that the transit program as a whole has indeed redistributed income from
high-income classes to low-income classes. Although the poor have
received less than their per-household share of the total transit subsidy,
they nevertheless have been more subsidized than they have been taxed.
Moreover, because the benefit/cost ratios of services used by poor transit
riders exceed those of services used primarily by affluent riders, the
distribution of true benefits (utility impacts) has been substantially
more favorable to low-income households than is suggested by the distribu-
tion of subsidy expenditures.
iii
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The current transit subsidy program, therefore, does not exacerbate
inequality in the distribution of income; but neither does it redistribute
income very efficiently in comparison with other types of government pro-
grams designed explicitly to aid the poor. This relative inefficiency in
redistribution arises from the very nature of transit services. Less
than a fifth of the nation's urban poor use any form of conventional
transit, and the vast majority of transit riders are not poor. Thus,
transit subsidization provi.des virtually no benefits to 80% of the poor,
and most of the transit subsidy (91%) is spent to serve the non-poor.
In contrast, general income assistance programs reach a much higher per-
centage of the poor and can altogether exclude the affluent. Even welfare
assistance in-kind, such as the provision of housing, medical care, and
food, is more efficient in this respect. The current transit subsidy
program, therefore, is not justifiable solely, or even primarily, on the
basis of its benefits to the poor.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Alan A. Altshuler, Chairman, Department of
Political Science
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INTRODUCTION: SUBSIDIZATION OF A DECLINING INDUSTRY
The relative importance of transit in the United States has declined
precipitously since the early 1900's, when it was the dominant mode of
urban travel. This decline was particularly rapid from 1945 to 1975.
Over these 3 decades, transit ridership fell by 80%, and vehicle miles of
transit service were reduced by 40%. At the same time, urban auto travel
increased substantially, so that the percentage of urban passenger mileage
served by transit dropped from 35% to only 3%.
Although the level of transit service decreased sharply over this
period, the total operating costs of transit in the United States more than
tripled. Even adjusted to control for inflation, operating costs per
vehicle mile rose by 67%.2 These increasing costs, combined with decreas-
ing patronage, rendered the American transit industry as a whole only
marginally profitable after 1950 and increasingly unprofitable since 1963,
when the industry ran its first operating deficit. The rate of deficit
growth has been particularly rapid in recent years. Indeed, since 1970 the
national transit operating loss has increased by an average of about 36% per
year (29% in constant dollars). 3
Factors in the Decline of Transit
The most important factors in the decline of transit have been the
rising level of personal income per capita in the United States and the
suburbanization of both residences and employment within metropolitan
areas. For most trip purposes, at most times of day, and over most routes,
the automobile clearly provides a superior quality of urban transportation.
1
2It is generally faster, more convenient, more comfortable, and more
dependable than transit service and, in addition, offers greater privacy
and more flexibility in scheduling and routing. The primary advantage of
transit has been its low cost; conversely, the main disadvantage of auto
ownership and operation has been its considerable expense. As levels of
personal income have grown, the cost savings of transit have been largely
offset by the increasingly valued quality of auto transportation, which
has become more and more affordable. 4
Whereas increasing affluence has decreased the number of travelers
forced to depend on transit out of economic necessity, suburbanization--
especially the very low-density development since 1945--has sharply
reduced the proportion of the urban population for which transit is even a
conceivable alternative. It has not been feasible for transit operators
to extend service to low-density suburbs because travel volumes over
individual routes in these areas are usually so low that transit service is
uneconomical. Thus, most outer portions of American metropolitan areas
currently have almost no viable transit service, and central cities, have
only about half the vehicle miles of service they had in 1945. Further-
more, the suburbanization of employment, in particular, has reduced the
volume of trips to and from the downtown area. Because transit's compara-
tive advantage vis-a-vis the auto is greatest for such trips, the decline
of the inner city as an employment center has been especially detrimental
to transit's overall economic viability.
Various additional factors have contributed to transit's financial
troubles and ridership losses since 1945. The increased.peaking of transit
use during rushhours has exacerbated the underutilization of transit workers,
3vehicles, and rights of way during non-rush hours, and thus has increased
the average cost of providing transit service. 5  Moreover, the absolute
decline in transit ridership over the last 30 years has, to a significant
extent, vitiated the economies of scale in transit, particularly in rail
transit operations. Finally, there have been considerable technological
improvements in auto design and in the urban highway network that have
further widened the quality gap between the auto and mass transit.
The Role of Public Policy
Prior to 1970, government intervention to offset transit's decline
was minimal. Indeed, public policy may have inadvertently accelerated
this decline. For example, sizable homeowner subsidies, extensive urban
highway construction, and neglect of the social costs of the auto both
facilitated and reinforced suburbanization and the switch to the automobile.
Considerable suburbanization would have occurred, in any event, as
the result of increasing affluence and technological advances in communica-
tions and manufacturing, but the rate of suburbanization was undoubtedly
accelerated by homeowner subsidies and the political fragmentation of
urban areas. Most of the single-family housing construction financed by
Federal income tax deduction allowances and mortgage guarantees to home-
owners has taken place in the suburbs, where land values have been low
enough to permit such low-density development. By 1945, moreover, most
of the central portions of metropolitan areas had already been built up,
and space for new single-family housing was not generally available.
Suburban development, of course, came at the expense of reduced construc-
tion and maintenance of higher-density rental housing and withdrew many
4potential transit passengers from the central city corridors where most
transit service was located. It has been estimated that homeowner subsi-
dies, which amounted to almost $10 billion in 1970 alone, have had the
cumulative effect of inflating the geographic size of metropolitan areas
by roughly one-fifth.7  Decentralization was further reinforced by the
political balkanization of local governments within metropolitan areas.
Such balkanization has encouraged the flight of each area's affluent
residents to the suburbs to escape the high tax rates and welfare burden
of central cities while still continuing to enjoy many of the public
services provided by central jurisdictions.8
Massive suburban-oriented expressway construction during the 1960's
also facilitated suburbanization and auto use by increasing the accessi-
bility of outlying areas and by enhancing the geographic range and speed
of automobiles within urban areas. There is considerable debate as to
how much of this freeway construction was economically justifiable and
how much, in fact, was excessive. Clearly, however, the vast improvements
made in the urban highway network between 1955 and 1975 were essential
to the extensive suburbanization during that period. They also increased
the relative advantages of auto travel over transit use and consequently
led to a further decline in mass transit patronage.
Finally, the social costs of auto use--with the exception of conges-
tion--were largely ignored by government agencies until about 1970. Auto
noise, air pollution, and traffic accidents were tolerated as unavoidable
side-effects of progress. As elementary economic analysis indicates,
however, the failure to internalize these social externalities by incor-
porating their cost in the price of auto use unambiguously leads to a
5socially excessive amount of auto use. The quantitative significance of
auto underpricing has been almost totally a matter of subjective specula-
tion, but to whatever extent such underpricing has occurred, it has probably
accentuated somewhat the shift away from mass transit.
At the same time public policy abetted suburbanization and auto use,
a laissez-faire attitude was taken with respect to the decline of transit,
which was viewed as an obsolete industry. Prior to 1965, transit operators
were expected to cover virtually all of their operating expenses from fare-
box revenues, and capital subsidies were grossly inadequate for upgrading
or even maintaining transit vehicles and rights of way.9 In the face of
declining patronage and revenues and increasing costs, transit operators
were forced to increase fares, eliminate service, and allow the aging
capital stock to deteriorate even further. Transit patronage, of course,
plummeted even faster in response to these measures, thus exacerbating
the financial difficulties of transit. Government aid increased somewhat
between 1965 and 1970, but not sufficiently so as to reverse the vicious
circle of fare increases, service cutbacks, and ridership losses.
Changing Priorities of Urban Transportation Policy
Around 1970, there was a dramatic shift in urban transportation
policy. Widespread dissatisfaction with the adverse environmental and
social impacts of urban highways and auto use enhanced the relative attrac-
tiveness of transit, whose adverse side-effects were perceived to be much
less significant. Moreover, transit was increasingly viewed as essential
to the mobility of the poor, the elderly, and the handicapped; to reviving
the decaying central cities; and more recently, to conserving energy.10
6Increased government concern for transit has involved a shift from
private to public ownership and operation of transit systems and sub-
stantial growth in the level of both operating and capital subsidies. In
1965, only 12 transit systems in the United States were publicly owned. 11
By 1976, the number of publicly-owned systems had grown to 146, and these
accounted for 87% of total transit vehicle miles operated in the United
12
States and for 91% of revenue passengers. Accompanying this shift in
the locus of responsibility for providing transit service, government
financial aid to transit burgeoned, especially after 1970. Indeed, operat-
ing subsidies grew from $.3 billion in 1970 to $2.2 billion in 1976;
transit fares currently cover less than 55% of total nationwide operatingex-
penses. Capital investment costs of transit are now almost entirely
financed by government capital grants, which increased from $.2 billion
in 1970 to $1.9 billion in 1976. The total transit subsidy, therefore,
rose from $.5 billion to $4.1 billion, an 8-fold increase in only 6 years.13
Not only has government financial support increased substantially,
but this increase has occurred at a time when vi.rtually all levels of
government in the U.S. have been under acute pressure to slow expenditure
growth. This period of fiscal austerity, moreover, has been particularly
severe for local governments in the large, dense metropolitan areas, where
most transit service is concentrated. Thus, the opportunity costs of
transit subsidization have increased even more dramatically than the
nominal dollar costs.
Transit Subsidies for the Poor
One alleged justification for this increasingly burdensome government
financial support of mass transit has been the need to compensate the poor
7for the inadvertent disadvantage they have experienced as a result of the
massive switch to the automobile and the concomitant decentralization of
metropolitan areas. While the urban transportation revolution has dramatic-
ally benefitted those able to afford the high costs of auto ownership and
operation, low-income travelers have had to rely much more than other groups
on transit, the quality of which has diminished as a result both of the
absolute decline in vehicle miles of service and the suburbanization of
employment and residence, which has rendered most destinations in urban
areas accessible only by automobile. The impacts of substandard transporta-
tion may be particularly detrimental to the welfare of the poor, because it
yet further restricts their range of recreational, cultural, educational,
shopping, and employment opportunities, which are already significantly
circumscribed by their low incomes and the burden of a number of associated
socioeconomic pathologies. Even those low-income households that own autos
are virtually forced to do so by the nature of the available options and
thus must spend an inordinate portion of their incomes on transportation.
It has been argued that the upgrading (or at minimum, preservation)
of transit service and its availability at subsidized, low fares are
essential for enhancing the transportation options of the poor, and, more
generally, for promoting a more egalitarian distribution of income. In
light of the large and rapidly growing public expenditure devoted to
transit subsidization, examination of the validity of these arguments
becomes increasingly important.
Study Objectives and Overview
The purpose of this study is to examine the extent to which the
benefits of transit subsidy programs--as currently designed--actually accrue
8to low-income users and the degree to which low-income households ultimately
pay the tax costs of these programs. In assessing the distributional impact
of transit subsidies, the study should be useful in redesigning the charac-
ter of the subsidies to improve their effectiveness in achieving redistri-
butive objectives.
To ascertain the net distributional effect, both the benefits and
tax costs of transit subsidization are allocated among income classes. The
decomposition of user benefits is achieved through analysis of the income
distribution of the users of each of the various types of transit services
and the degree to which each type of transit service is subsidized. Non-
user benefits accruing to transit workers, downtown landowners and businesses
are also examined, although precise quantitative estimates of all the
resulting distributional impacts are not made.
The incidence of tax costs is estimated by determining the mix of
tax mechanisms currently used to finance the subsidies and the percentage
contribution from each level of government. These. data on the composition
of transit subsidy funds are used to weight the incidence pattern of each
tax used, and thus to obtain an aggregate tax incidence estimate.
The analysis indicates not only the overall equity impact but also
the very different impacts of different portions of the transit program.
Moreover, although most of the quantitative distributional estimates are
based on nationwide aggregates, considerable attention is focused on the
substantial variation in net distributional impact from one type of metro-
politan area to another.
PART I: THE BENEFITS OF TRANSIT SUBSIDIZATION AND THEIR
DISTRIBUTION AMONG INCOME CLASSES
Transit subsidies provide a number of different types of benefits
to a variety of different groups. Transit riders obviously benefit
directly from expanded or upgraded service and .cheaper fares made possible
by subsidization. Owners of downtown land benefit indirectly from the
public construction and operation of transit routes, which increase the
accessibility of their holdings and thus the value of their land and the
rents they can charge. Central city businesses also benefit. They can
more easily attract customers and employees as a result of better or
cheaper transit service; as a consequence, they can make more sales,
charge higher prices, and pay lower wages. Moreover, transit services
may provide a number of social benefits--for example, reduced levels of
congestion, noise, and air pollution; more compact land-use patterns;
greater passenger and pedestrian safety; and increased energy conservation.
Although the extent of these social benefits is questionable, they clearly
redound to a group much larger than transit riders alone and are quite
different in nature from those attributable to time savings, fare savings,
or improved ride quality experienced by transit riders.
To some degree transit subsidization also entails a direct transfer
of income from taxpayers to factors in the production of transit services.
For example, a significant portion of the increasing operating subsidy to
transit in the U.S. is believed by many to have been siphoned off by union-
ized transit laborers via excessive increases in wages and fringe benefits
and the forced hiring of an unnecessarily large number of workers. Thus,
9
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much of the operating deficit may be attributable to artificially inflated
labor costs. This impact could not be considered a genuine benefit of
transit services, but it certainly affects the net distributional conse-
quences of the subsidy program.
The overall benefit distribution, of course, depends on both the rela-
tive importance of each type of benefit and the income distribution of each
type of benefitting group. These income distributions vary substantially.
Transit riders, for example, have lower incomes on average than do transit
workers, who in turn have lower incomes than do downtown landowners.
Chapter 1 examines approaches to measuring each of the types of bene-
fits noted above and catalogues the considerable difficulties in making
quantitative estimates of them. The income distribution of transit riders
is discussed in Chapter 2, which highlights the variations in rider incomes
according to type of transit, length of trip, time of day and direction of
trip, portion of system used, and type of metropolitan area. On the basis
of these income variations, estimates of the distribution of operating
subsidies among income classes are made in Chapter 3. Correspondirng esti-
mates of the distribution of capital subsidies are made in Chapter 4.
The relation of expenditures to actual benefits is discussed in Chapter 5,
as is the variation in this relation from one type of subsidy to another.
Although nationwide, aggregate distributions are calculated, a central
theme of the analysis is the dramatic variation in distributional impact
according to type of subsidy, type of transit subsidized, and size and
type of city. For many purposes, the nature and extent of this variation
is of greater policy significance than the estimated overall impact.
CHAPTER 1: MEASURING THE BENEFITS OF TRANSIT SUBSIDIES
A major difficulty in evaluating the distribution of transit subsidy
benefits is determining the ultimate impact of the subsidies. To what
extent, for example, have operating subsidies resulted in lower fares or
service improvements as opposed to higher transit labor wages or lower
productivity? The relative importance of each effect largely determines
the extent to which different types of groups are benefitted, which in
turn significantly affects the resulting distribution of benefits among
income classes. Precise -quantitative estimates of the actual extent of
each type of effect are not available, primarily because appropriate data
for such a decomposition do not exist. However, the results of sharp changes
in the level or rate of growth of transit subsidization in a few cities
suggest that all four effects occur at least to some extent.
Short-Run Impacts of Operating Subsidies
Cleveland provides an excellent example of the impact of increased
subsidization. From 1974 to 1976, the total operating subsidy increased
by 30-fold, from only $1.5 million to $45.3 million. As a consequence,
fares were cut in half, and free transfers were allowed throughout the
system. Vehicle miles of service were increased by 30%. Special para-
transit services were instituted for the elderly and handicapped, and
increased police surveillance cut the number of crimes on the transit
system by about 50%. These increased passenger benefits, however, came
at the price of a 76% increase in total operating costs, a considerable
11
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portion of which was attributable to generous wage settlements with the
unions.
In contrast to Cleveland, operating subsidies were actually reduced
in Pittsburgh and New York City. In Pittsburgh, the operating subsidy
decreased by 10% between 1975 and 1976, whereas it had increased by 84%
between 1974 and 1975. Fares were raised by 25%, and vehicle miles of
service were curtailed by 7%. Concerted efforts were made to increase
efficiency, and the rate of transit labor cost growth fell from 11% to 7%,
only slightly in excess of the general rate of inflation in the economy.2
The New York City Transit Authority's response to New York's -fiscal
crisis also yields some insights into the nature of subsidy impacts. The
operating subsidy to the Authority decreased by 18% from 1975 to 1976, whereas
it had increased by 45% from 1974 to 1975. Vehicle miles of service fell by
5%, fares were increased by 43%, and wages were officially frozen., with
increases contingent on definite productivity gains. As a consequence,
labor costs grew by only 2% (vs. 15% from 1974 to 1975), and a number of
programs were implemented to eliminate inefficiencies and thus to reduce
costs.3
Thus, the short-run impact of sharp changes in operating subsidiza-
tion has included all of the effects hypothesized. The precise breakdown
of the impact, however, is ambiguous. Even in the three cases just noted,
it is difficult to determine, for example, exactly the extent to which
labor costs have grown faster than the rate of labor productivity. Indeed,
there is considerable controversy as to the apporpriate measure of transit
labor productivity. Depending on which measure is used, the estimated
degree of excessive labor cost inflation is either negligible, moderate,
or very great. It is conceivable, moreover, that the relative importance
13
of each type of subsidy impact is different over a period of time longer
than a year. Data are not available for establishing the extent of the
difference between the short-run and long-run impact. Most of the effect
of operating subsidization,however, probably occurs during the period of
the subsidization; it is unlikely, therefore, that any differences would
be significant.
Impacts of Capital Subsidies
The most significant direct impact of the capital subsidy program
has been to provide improved or expanded service for riders by financing
the construction and maintenance of rail transit rights of way and the pur-
chase of rail vehicles and buses. In general, these improvements have
increased the comfort and reliability of transit travel and, in certain
instances, have increased vehicle miles of service.
The social benefits of capital subsidies may also be substantial;
indeed, the allegedly desirable land-use impacts of rail rapid transit have
been one of their main bases of justification. Whatever the degreeof truly
social benefits, however, large-scale, radial, CBD-focused rail transit
systems clearly yield substantial private benefits to downtown landowners.
Although central city businesses also benefit, increased rents may minimize
their net benefits. Increased property taxes likewise reduce the net bene-
fits of landowners. A quantitative decomposition of the actual impacts of
capital subsidies is particularly difficult because benefits tend to be
diffuse and, in contrast to operating subsidies, spread over an indeter-
minately long period of time.
Strategies for measuring benefit impacts are examined in the remainder
of this chapter. Both non-rider and rider benefits will be analyzed, and to
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the extent that any non-user impacts can be quantified, these estimates
are derived. The quantitative estimates of rider benefits are, however,
developed in Chapters 2 through 4.
Benefits to Transit Employees
Over the period of the 7-fold growth in transit subsidies since 1970,
average transit salaries have increased by 60%.4 Even when adjusted to
control for inflation, the real wages of transit workers have grown more
than 3 times as fast as real wages in the rest of the United States economy
(13% vs. 4%).5 Including fringe benefits, the average salary in the U.S.
transit industry in 1976 was $18,934.6 In large transit-oriented cities,
the average was higher; for example, it was $22,634 in Boston. Since
this average incorporates the relatively low wages of clerks and typists,
the average transit operator's wage was even higher. Clearly, transit
laborers as a whole are not a low-income group.
Moreover, the rapid increase in transit wages and fringe benefits
has come at a time of declining transit labor productivity. Passengers
carried per employee fell by 18% between 1970 and 1976, and vehicle miles
of service provided per employee fell by 9%.8 In contrast, labor produc-
tivity in the rest of the urban economy (in terms of output per employee
hour) increased by 10% over the same period.9 Yet transit wages have been
increasing much faster than those in other sectors of the economy. The
implication is that transit wages have grown at least 20% faster since
1970 than would be justifiable on the grounds of productivity changes, and
possibly by as much as 30%. Depending on which of the two notions of
productivity is applicable (and some undoubtedly would argue that neither
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is adequate), from 15% to 22% of the current operating subsidy is directly
attributable to what may be termed "excessive" labor costs. To some
extent, the low level of labor productivity results from a labor force of
unnecessarily large size, but even this is primarily the responsibility
of the labor unions, which have vigorously fought for no-layoff contracts,
highly inefficient work rules, and, in a few cities, deliberate overmanning
of transit vehicles.
The transit unions themselves appear to be acutely cognizant of the
benefits they derive from public transit subsidization. Indeed, they have
been the single most important backer of Federal transit subsidies, although
they have demanded in return for their support a number of provisions
(most notably, Section 13c)0 which virtually guarantee future escalation
of transit labor costs.
Of course, there is probably substantial variation from one metro-
politan area to another in the extent to which transit subsidies accrue
to transit labor. In general, the benefit shift is most pronounced in the
largest cities of the Northeast, Great Lakes, and Pacific Coast regions--
with the highest rates of. unionization--and least significant in small
cities or Southern cities. Wage differentials noted in Tables 1.. 1 and 1 .2
suggest such variation. Within each population size category, much of
the variation in transit labor wages can be explained by differences in
union bargaining power. Thus, in strong union towns such as New York,
Chicago, and Boston, the average hourly wage rates of transit operators in
1975 were $6.72, $7.12, and $7.19, respectively. Wages were much lower
*
Unfortunately, it was not possible to adjust for differences in the
cost of living by city size. Thus, the figures in Table 2.1 overstate the
differences in real wage rates across the urban size spectrum.
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Table 1.1 Transit Wage Rates by Population Size 11
City Population
1 ,000,000 or more
500,000 to 1,000,000
250,000 to 500,000
100,000 to 250,000
Average Hourly Rate (1975)
$6.61
6.51
5.80
4.99
Table 1 .2 Transit Wage Rates by Region 12
Region
New England
Middle Atlantic
Border
Southeast
Southwest
Great Lakes
Middle West
Mountain
Pacific
Average Hourly Rate (1975)
Nominal Real*
$6.23 $5.32
6.44 6.07
6.42 6.26
5.32 5.85
4.42 4.91
6.39 6.33
5.83 5.89
5.28 5.56
6.50 6.44
in the less unionized towns of New Orleans ($4.41), San Antonio ($4.60),
and Houston ($5.05).13 Even controlling for differences in the cost of
living, the difference between the average real wage in the unionized
cities and that in the less unionized cities is considerable ($6.28 vs.
$5.21).14
*Adjusted for differences among regions in the cost of living.
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Benefits to Downtown Landowners and Businesses
Improved transit services can indirectly benefit individuals and
firms by making them more accessible from other parts of the metropolitan
area. Since transit systems in most cities focus radially on downtown, it
is this area that gains most in accessibility by upgrading and expansion of
conventional transit service or even by a lowering of fares. Downtown land-
owners are probably the most significant beneficiaries of this type. Land
values and rents have typically skyrocketed in the vicinity of new rail
transit construction, and they undoubtedly have also increased--although
less spectacularly--as the result of artificially low, subsidized fares or
service improvements. It is difficult to determine the exact extent of the
net benefit, however; depending on the specific metropolitan area, sharp
increases in property taxation of such sites may siphon off much of the
increased rent value. Indeed, it has been proposed that such value-capture
taxation be employed as a major source of funds for subway construction.
Currently, however, it is likely that a considerable amount of the benefits
to landowners is not withdrawn in this manner.
Central city businesses also benefit from transit subsidization.
To the extent that these are not landowners, however, most of the accessi-
bility benefits derived from the transit improvements are probably extracted
eventually by landowners via higher rents. Short-run benefits, in terms
of greater accessibility to customers and employees, may nevertheless be
substantial.
The degree of benefit to downtown landowners and businesses may be
suggested by the strong support these groups have given transit improvement
programs. Indeed, at the local level, they have probably been the most
effective advocates of transit.
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Social Benefits of Transit Subsidies
In support of transit subsidization, it has been alleged that transit
service aids in the reduction of auto air pollution, noise, congestion,
traffic accidents, and energy use and promotes a more compact land-use
pattern. Aside from the issue of who benefits from such impacts, there is
the fundamental question of their actual extent. Available empirical
studies have focused primarily on measuring the short-run, marginal impact
of increases in transit service and have not attempted to calculate either
the long-run impact of such increases or the total overall social benefit
produced by transit. These analyses have generally estimated that each of
the alleged social benefits of increased transit service is in most cities
negligible in extent and highly cost-ineffective with respect to the achieve-
ment of economic, social, and environmental objectives. Most studies
conclude, therefore, that substantial expansion of transit service--and in
particular, rail rapid transit construction--cannot be justified on the
basis of social benefits this would produce. Such a result can be explained
almost entirely by the failure of expansion efforts to attract many addi-
tional riders, which in turn is the consequence primarily of the current,
high level of auto ownership and the low density of recent urban develop-
ment, which simply cannot be well served by conventional, high-volume
transit technology.
It does not follow from these analyses, however, that the total
social benefit of existing transit service is insignificant or that a
substantial reduction in the level of transit service is justified. On
the contrary, it is quite likely that the oldest transit routes--those in
the densest, largest cities--produce much greater social benefit than
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proposed extensions in low-density areas. Indeed, whereas existing land-use
patterns sharply limit the potential effectiveness of transit expansion,
they reinforce the benefits of preserving existing service to high-density
districts. Subsidies aimed at maintaining or moderately upgrading existing
services in dense corridors of large metropolitan areas may, therefore,
yield substantial benefits in terms of making possible the continuation of
existing, dense districts, which developed before the widespread use of the
auto. Whether or not high-density urban development is necessary or even
desirable is another and highly subjective matter. Moreover, it is not
clear to what extent the supposed social benefits of compact land-use are
not already reflected in higher land values and rents in transit-oriented
cities.
Likewise, it is probable that air pollution, congestion, and traffic
accident levels in New York and other dense central cities are signifi:cantly
lower than they would be if everyone drove a car. But for most American
cities, land-use patterns are too diffuse to be served efficiently by
transit. Even large increases in subsidization have produced negligible
ridership gains and consequently have had little impact on ameliorating con-
gestion or any of the other external social costs of the auto.
The benefits of congestion reduction, to whatever extent transit is
responsible for it, redound primarily to auto users. In corridors of large,
dense cities, where transit is most likely to produce such benefits, these
auto commuters tend to have incomes well above average. Air pollution and
noise abatement benefits attributable to transit probably redound primarily
to central city residents, who have incomes significantly lower than those
of suburbanites, on average. Passenger safety benefits obviously accrue to
transit riders, who tend to have below-average incomes; non-occupant safety
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benefits accrue primarily to central city residents (and to a lesser extent,
workers), many of whom currently become the victims of auto accidents.*
Energy savings benefits, if any do result from transit, presumably accrue
to the country at large, but particularly to those regions heavily depend-
ent on oil.
On the whole, however, the quantitative importance of the social
benefits of transit is a matter of considerable dispute; hence, it is not
clear how significantly these affect the overall distribution of transit
subsidy benefits among income classes.
Benefits to Transit Riders
It has generally been assumed that most of the benefits of transit
subsidies accrue to transit riders. Although other groups also benefit
from transit subsidies, the assumption of benefits accruing exclusively to
riders is a necessary one for purposes of analysis; adequate data simply are
not available to measure the extent and distributional impact of benefits to
other groups. Moreover, it is quite likely that most--even if not al1--of
transit subsidy benefits do in fact redound to riders.
The first problem in establishing the extent of rider benefits is
determining the degree to which subsidies have resulted in lower fares as
opposed to better service. The former effect is more beneficial to low-
income riders, who have a relatively high marginal utility of income,
whereas the latter is more beneficial to higher-income riders, who place a
relatively high value on speed, comfort, and reliability. These fare and
*
Roughly one-third of all urban auto traffic fatalities are pedes-
trians. 16
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service impacts almost certainly vary in relative importance from one
metropolitan area to another, and the impact within any given area is likely
to vary according to mode, time of day, and portion of the system. For
example, recent service cutbacks in New York were greater for subway service
than for bus service (5% vs. 3% decreases in vehicle miles between 1975 and
1976), 1 and the effective fare increase for bus service was less severe
due to a lowering of the price of transfers between bus routes. Similarly,
percentage service curtailments varied by time of day and specific route.*
Because the income distribution of transit riders varies significantly by
specific transit mode, time of day of use, and portion of system used, this
variation in fare and service impacts of transit subsidies may have substan-
tial distributional impact.
Unfortunately, it is exceedingly difficult to effect a corresponding
decomposition at the national level of analysis in the next four chapters.
The aggregate figures available conceal the impacts of subsidization by
masking the variation among metropolitan areas. Attempts to use regression
analysis to isolate the impacts of the subsidy growth between 1970 and 1975
have so far been fruitless; there simply is not enough information. Conse-
quently, the benefit analysis in Chapters 2 through 5 does not distinguish
between fare and service impacts of transit subsidies.
The discussion in those chapters would, at any rate, be limited by
*If the transit authority had been a private firm seeking to maximize
revenues, it would have increased fares most in markets with the least
elastic demand. (thus reducing ridership least) and raised them least in
markets with the most elastic demand (where fare increases would have
greatly discouraged patronage). Most sudies, in fact, suggest that the
elasticity of demand for travel is least for peak-hour use on subways and
greatest for off-peak use, especially of bus service. Consequently, one
might have expected the fare increases and service cutbacks to have been
greatest for rusn-hour subway service, whicl in fact they were.
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the inability to translate fare and service changes into true welfare changes
and to quantify these utility impacts in a manner such that they would be
comparable among different income groups. As explained more fully in
Appendix A, sufficient data werenotavailable for estimating the necessary
travel demand equations for each income class. Moreover, even if these
equations could have been estimated, the derived consumer surplus figures
would not have been comparable among different income groups.
In the light of these theoretical dilemmas and practical measurement
problems, no attempt was made to measure utility impacts. Instead, the
chapters that inmediately follow perform a straightforward assignment of
subsidy expenditures by income class on the basis of disaggregate data on
transit subsidy expenditures by type of transit service and corresponding
data on the income distribution of transit riders by type of transit service.
This approach, of course, fails to determine the distribution of true bene-
fits. But it does at least yield an estimate of the extent to which subsidy
expenditures are devoted to the types of transit services used by low-income
groups.
CHAPTER 2: THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF TRANSIT RIDERS
The distribution of transit subsidy benefits obviously depends pri-
marily on the income distribution of transit riders. Because the degree
of subsidization varies for different transit modes, it is necessary to
establish not only how the incomes of transit riders compare with those of
auto drivers, but also how the income distribution of riders varies for each
transit mode. Moreover, levels of subsidization can vary implicitly by time
of day of use, length of trip, direction of trip, and portion of system
used. Corresponding variations in rider incomes render these differences
in degrees of implicit subsidization of significant distributional conse-
quence as well.
The Composition of Ridership by Income Class
It is certainly not the case that all, or even most, transit riders
in the U.S. are poor. Transit riders do, however, have considerably lower
incomes on average than do other urban tripmakers. As indicated in Jable
2.1, 28% of transit users in 1970 had household incomes of less than $5,000;
the same income class accounted for only 10% of auto drivers and only 13% of
passengers. Although the average income of transit riders is significantly
less than that of travelers using other modes, it is only slightly less
than that of the urban population as a whole.* The top and bottom income
*The average income of travelers, of course, is higher than that
of the general population because low-income persons have lower trip-making
rates. Many of these persons are either elderly or unemployed; thus, they
make very few work trips and, moreover, are less able (either physically
or financially) to make other types of trips.
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Table 2.1 The Composition of Each Urban Transportation Mode's Riders by
Income Class (U,S, Aggregate, All Purposes, 1970)*,1
Income Class
Below $5,000- $10,000- $15,000 All
Group $5,000 $9,999 $14,999 or more incomes
All Households in the
U.S., 1970 28.4% 30.9% 23,0% 17.6% 100%
All Travelers 12.1% 42,0% 29.6% 16.2% 100%
Auto Drivers 10.1% 41.6% 31.1% 17.2% 100%
Auto Passengers 12.7% 43.2% 29.1% 15.1% 100%
Bus or Streetcar Riders** 34.1% 37.8% 16.4% 11.6% 100%
Subway or Elevated Riders 14.9% 41,8% 21.1% 21.1% 100%
Commuter Rail Riders 0% 35,1% 39,6% 25.2% 100%
Taxi Passengers 28.5% 42.3% 26.0% 13.3% 100%
Public Transporation
Users (Total, All Modes) 27.6% 37.1% 18.0% 17.7% 100%
*Each line displays the percentage distribution of each group among
the four income classes.
**Not including school-bus trips.
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classes account for roughly the same percentages of total transit riders
as they do of the general population. The overall average income of
transit riders is somewhat lower, however, due to the overrepresentation of
riders in the $5,000-$10,000 category and a corresponding underrepresenta-
tion in the $10,000-$15,000 category. *
For the purpose of evaluating the redistributional effectiveness of
transit subsidies relative to all other possible government programs, the
relevant base of comparison clearly is the income distribution of the general
population. In assessing the distributional impacts of transit subsidies
relative to other transportation programs, however, the income distribution
of travelers almost certainly is the more appropriate base. Obviously,
transit subsidization appears more favorably in this latter context. Both
types of comparisons may be useful depending on the specific public policy
issue at hand.
Noteworthy as well is the considerable degree of overlapping of
modal usage by income groups. Many car drivers are poor, and many transit
passengers are affluent. Thus general transit subsidization aids nop only
the 28% of transit passengers who are in the lowest-income bracket but also
the 18% of riders in the top income category. To the extent that equity
goals are of primary significance, such general subsidization does not
target the poor very effectively.
Differential subsidization of the various types of transit services,
however, could increase the concentration of subsidy benefits among the
*Unfortunately, it as not possible to control for household size.
Given the tendency for household size to increase with income, per capita
tripmaking ratesof the poor almost certainly are not as low relative to more
affluent classes as are per household tripmaking rates. Thus, Table 2.1
exaggerates to some extent the actual income differences between tripmakers
and the general population.
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poor. There exists substantial variation in the incomes of riders of
different transit modes. Cormuter rail passengers, for example, have
higher incomes than do users of any other mode of urban transportation
(see Table 2.1). Patrons of rail rapid transit (subway or elevated)
have incomes roughly the same as auto users. At the opposite end of the
spectrum, bus riders have the lowest average income of any modal user
group; they also have a considerably lower average income than does the
general population. These statistics suggest that the subsidization of
commuter rail primarily benefits affluent travelers. Government financial
support of rail rapid transit services appears to benefit higher income
classes slightly more than lower income classes. Evidently, only bus subsi-
dies are strongly progressive* in their distributional impact; even these
however, benefit affluent riders to some extent. Undoubtedly, the progres-
sivity of the transit subsidy program as a whole could be increased by
shifting subsidy funds out of the rail services and into bus transit.
The Incidence of Transit Use by Income Class
Whereas the compositional statistics of Table 2.1 are useful in
evaluating the distributional impact of transit subsidies, they do not
throw much light on the potential effectiveness of transit subsidization
*The term "progressive" is used here and subsequently in this study
as shorthand to denote the tendency of a program to make the size distribu-
tion of income less unequal. This should not be confused with the technical
definition, which denotes a distribution of tax costs (or more generally,
any series) such that, as a percentage of income, these increase as income
levels increase. Technically, therefore, a progressive distribution of
benefits is unfavorable to the poor. Given the widespread, popular impres-
sion that the term "progressive" indicates greater equality of income, it
has been used here in tnis sense. With respect to tax costs, of course, the
technical and popular interpretations coincide.
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in aiding the mobility of the poor and thereby improving their welfare.
As suggested by Table 2.2, transit subsidies cannot be expected to be very
effective as a general welfare program. Transit was used for only 14% of
the trips made by households earning less than $5,000 in 1970. This percent-
age is three times as high as the corresponding percentage for households
in the top income category, but it nevertheless represents a distinct
minority of all trips made by low-income households. Over 80% of trips made
by even the poorest subgroup sampled (less than $3,000 income) were made by
auto. 3 Clearly, however, transit is relatively more important as a mode
of travel for the poor; this is attributable almost entirely to the rela-
tively high incidence of bus use at the lower end of the income spectrum.
Indeed, the incidence of subway use was roughly the same for all income
classes, and no sample households earning less than $5,000 in 1970 used
commuter rail at all.*
Cost of Living Bias and Variation in Transit Rider Incomes by City Type
To some extent, the aggregate nationwide statistics presented, in
Tables 2-1 and 2-2 overstate the real incomes of transit riders relative to
auto useres. Similarly, they overstate the incomes of commuter rail and
subway riders relative to bus riders. Most transit riders--and all subway
and commuter rail passengers--are concentrated in large, dense metropolitan
areas, where both nominal incomes and the cost of living are among the highest
Comparisons of the NPTS data with other riderincome surveys suggest
that the incidence of commuter rail use among households earning less than
than $5,000 in 1970 was somewhat greater than 0%. Most of these studies
indicate that from 1% to 4% of commuter rail passengers come from this income
group. Corresponding incidence estimatesare likewise slightly greater than 0,
but nevertheless confirm that the incidence of commuter rail use is much
higher among high-income households than it is among low-income households. 4
28
Table 2.2 The Incidence of Urban Transportation Use by Mode of Travel for
Each Income Class (U.S. Aggregate, All Trip Purposes, 1970)*,2
Income Modes Total,
Class Auto Auto Bus or Subway or Commuter Taxi All Modes
Driver Passenger Streetcar Elevated Rail
Below
$5,000 47,6% 37.8% 12,2% 1.5% 0% .8% 100%
$5,000-
$7,499 55.8% 37.0% 5.5% 1.4% .1% .2% 100%
$7,500-
$9,999 57.6% 38.3% 2.5% 1.0% .2% .5% 100%
$10,000-
$14,999 60.3% 36,0% 2.4% .9% .3% .2% 100%
$15,000
or More 60.7% 34.0% 3.1% 1.6% .3% .3% 100%
A 11
Incomes, 57.3% 36.6% 4.4% 1.2% .2% .3% 100%
Total
*Each figure in the table represents the percentage of the total trips
of each income group made by the indicated mode.
29
in the United States. Although the average nominal income of transit riders
falls far short of that of auto commuters in these large metropolitan areas,
these big-city transit users do not appear nearly as poor relative to auto
users in smaller cities, where nominal incomes are lower, but the cost of
living is also lower. Aggregating across cities without controlling for the
cost of living introduces an upward bias in the estimation of the real incomes
of transit riders and a downward bias in the estimation of the real incomes
of auto users.
Circumventing this aggregation bias, the city-specific data of Table
2.3 indicate the differences in median earnings by mode of journey to work
in 1970. Without exception, the median earnings of transit riders are
significantly less than those of auto. drivers, and are slightly less than
those of auto passengers as well, except in the four cities with extensive
rapid transit and commuter rail systems. Moreover, the earnings differences
would have been significantly greater if the census sample had not been
limited to worktrips. The average income of work commuters is, in general,
higher than that of non-work travelers. The income gap between transit
commuters and non-worktrip transit riders is considerably greater than the
corresponding income gap for auto users. 6 Thus, even these city-specific
data overstate the relative earnings of transit riders.
Not surprisingly, Table 2.3 suggests that the higher the quality of
mass transit, the more likely it is to attract affluent riders. The table
also suggests that incomes of transit riders relative to their automotive
counterparts are higher in the largest, densest cities, which typically
have the best transit systems. In general, the larger and densera city is,
Unfortunately, city-specific data on non-work traveler incomes were
not available except for a few cities.
Table 2.3 Median Earnings of Work Commuters 5by Mode of Travel for
Selected Metropolitan Areas, 1970
Ratio of
Modes Auto Dri-
Metro- Transit ver's to
politan All Auto Auto Public Share Transit
Area Workers Driver Passenger Traspor- of Work Median
Trips Income
New York*,***
Chicago*s***
Philadelphia*,***
New Orleans
Boston*%***
Washington**
San Francisco**
Pittsburgh
Cleveland
Baltimore
Milwaukee
Buffalo
Atlanta
Minneapolis
Miami
Detroit
Cincinnati
St. Louis
Seattle
Dallas
Portland
Los Angeles
Kansas City
Houston
Denver
San Diego
$8,008
7,847
7,138
6,465
7,300
8,265
7,873
7,148
7,706
6,837
7 ,147
6,995
7,095
7,291
6,436
8,400
7,113
7,135
7,930
7,025
7,142
7,720
6,951
6,974
5,970
6,307
$9,577
9,144
8,304
7,725
8,816
9,490
8,825
8,229
8,840
8,090
8,347
8,058
8,016
8,512
7,413
9,389
8,125
8,089
8,760
7,854
7,564
8,506
7,775
7,855
7,739
7,458
$7,243
5,893
5,640
5,354
5,461
7,524
6,440
5,594
5,471
5,484
5,201
5,225
5,030
4,875
4,224
5,980
5,129
5,309
5,947
4,667
5,838
5,411
4,909
4,836
4,962
4,782
$7,404
6,770
5,790
4,022
5,546
6,206
6,253
5,463
5,177
4,210
4,385
4,203
3,643
4,348
3,199
4,880
4,205
4,138
5,198
3,871
5,381
4,160
3,856
3,440
4,241
3,455
47%
23%
20%
20%
19%
16%
15%
14%
13%
13%
12%
10%
9%
9%
9%
8%
8%
8%
7%
6%
6%
6%
5%
5%
4%
4%
1.29
1.35
1.43
1.92
1.59
1.53
1.41
1.51
1.49
1.92
1.90
1.92
2.20
1.96
2.32
1.92
1.93
1.95
1.69
2.03
1.41
2.04
2.02
2.28
1.82
2.16
*Designated
**Designated
cities had rail
cities had rail
rapid transit in 1970.
rapid transit in 1976 but not in 1970 at
the time of the Census.
***Designated cities had extensive commuter rail systems.
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the more extensive is its transit system and the more likely is it to have
rapid transit and commuter rail service. For those metropolitan areas
with rail rapid transit in 1970, the ratio of auto driver median earnings
to transit rider median earnings was only 1.43 on average, as opposed to a
ratio of 1.90 for cities having only bus transit.
Table 2.4 confirms that transit rider incomes are indeed higher in
larger metropolitan areas, but indicates that almost all of the income varia-
tion derives from the differential relative importance of rail rapid transit
and commuter rail. The more extensively these are available, the higher the
average transit rider income. As suggested earlier, the average income of
all travelers in aggregate is considerably higher in metropolitan areas
with a million or more residents. Relative to the differing base income
distributions of all travelers, bus riders have roughly the same incomes
regardless of city size.
Other Variations in Rider Incomes
Because implicit levels of transit subsidization can vary by time of
day, length and direction of trip, and geographic portion of system used,
corresponding variations in rider incomes can significantly affect the
overall distribution of transit subsidies among income classes.
Time of Day: Table 2.5 shows that the distribution of transit rider
incomes varies significantly according to the time of travel. Households
with incomes less than $5,000 in 1970 accounted for 41% of off-peak bus
patronage but for only 25% of rush-hour patronage. Similarly, they accounted
for 23%o of off-peak rapid transit (subway) ridership but for only 9% of
rush-hour ridership. Although the average income of transit riders is
Table 2.4 The Composition of7Each Urban Transportation Mode's Riders by Income Class by Size of
Metropolitan Area. (All Trip Purposes, 1970)*
Percent of
Income Class all trips by
Mode of Travel Below $5,000- $10,000- $15,000 All each mode,
$5,000 $9,999 $14,999 or More incomes total for
all incomes
Population of 1,000,000 or more
All Travelers 10.1% 35.3% 34.2% 20.4% 100% 100%
Auto Driver 7,6 34,2 36.7 21,5 100 57.0
Auto Passenger 10.2 35.5 34.3 20.0 100 33.8
Bus or Streetcar 32.5 39,4 16.7 11.4 100 5.9
Subway - Elevated 14.9 42.8 21,2 21.1 100 2.4
Commuter Rail 0 35.8 38.5 25.6 100 .4
Population of 500,000 to 1,000,000
All Travelers 15,9% 49.6% 26.6% 7.9% 100% .100%
Auto Driver 14 49.5 27.7 8.8 100 57.6
Auto Passenger 16.5 51.3 25.9 6.2 100 37.8
Bus or Streetcar 34.8 35.7 17.7 11.7 100 4.4
Population of Less Than 5;00,000
All Travelers 13.6% 48.5% 24.2% 13.8% 100% 100%
Auto Driver 12.2 48.7 24.6 14.6 100 57.5
Auto Passenger 14.2 49.1 24.2 12.7 100 40.2
Bus or Streetcar 40 33.5 13.8 12.7 100 2.1
*Only trips shorter than 50 miles were included.
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Table 2,5 Distribution of Mode of Travel by Income Class by Time of Day8
(U.S. Aggregate, 1970, All Purposes)a
Percentage
Income Class of Total
Under $5,000- $10,000- $15,000 All IndicatedMode/Time of Day $5,000 $9,999 $14,999 or More Incomes Mode at
Indicated
Time
All Modes (off-peak)b 12.9% 42.4% 29.3% 15.4% 100% 72.6%
All Modes (rush hour)b 10.4 42.1 30.4 17.2 100 27.4
All Modes (all times) 12.2 42.4 29.6 15.9 100 100
Auto Driver (off-peak) 10.7 41.8 30,9 16.6 100 71.6
Auto Driver (rush hour) 8.6 41.2 31.6 18.7 100 28.4
Auto Driver (all times) 10.1 41.6 31.1 17.2 100 100
Auto Passenger (off-peak) 13.3 42.9 28.7 15.1 100 79.3
Auto Passenger (rush hour) 9.9 44.3 31.0 14.8 100 20.7
Auto Passenger (all times) 12.7 43.2 29.2 15.0 100 100
Bus (off-peak) 40,5 37.8 13.1 8.7 100 58.1
Bus (rush hour) 25.4 37.8 20.9 15.8 100 41.9
Bus (all times) 34.2 37.9 16.4 11.7 100 100
Subway (off-peak) 22.6 42.6 19.4 15,4 100 44.8
Subway (rush hour) 8.9 43 22.6 25.5 100 52.2
Subway (all times) 15.1 42.9 21.1 21.0 100 100
Commuter Rail (off-peak) 0 44.8 27.6 27,7 100 38.9
Commuter Rail (rush hour) 0 29.1 47.2 23.6 100 61.1
Commuter Rail (all times) 0 35.1 39.6 25.2 100 100
Taxi (off-peak) 31.2 42.2 16.2 10.4 100 80.2
Taxi (rush hour) 17.3 42.8 15.1 24.8 100 19.8
Taxi (all times) 28.5 42.3 16.0 13.3 100 100
6:30 P.M.
(A)(A)
aIncluding intraurban trips only (excluding overnight trips and all trips longer than 50 miles).
bRush hour is defined as Monday through Friday, from 7:00 A.M. to 9:00 A.M. and from 4:30 P.M. to
All other times are defined to be off-peak,
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thus substantially lower during off-peak hours than it is during rush
hours, there is no significant variation in the incomes of auto users by
time of day.
Length of Trip: It has been hypothesized that rider incomes also
vary according to trip distance. 9 Most transit service either originates
or terminates in the downtown area. Because suburban riders live farther
from downtown and have higher ircomesthan do central city riders, the aver-
age trip length of low-income transit users might reasonably be expected
to be shorter than that of riders with higher incomes. Surprisingly, the
very limited empirical evidence on trips lengths by income class only partly
bears out the hypothesis. As indicated in Table 2.6, bus trip distances in
1970wer.e moderately longer for high-income riders than for low-income
riders, but rapid transit trips were actually somewhat longer for low-income
riders. Of course, the accuracy of the data on which the table is based
Table 2.6 Mean Trip Distance (In Miles) by Income Class for Each Urban
Transportation Mode10 (U.S. Aggregate, 1970, All Purposes)
Mode
Income Class Auto Auto Bus or Subway or Commuter
Driver Passenger Streetcar* Elevated Rail*
Below $5,000 6.6 7.0 6.0 12.9 -
$5,000 - $9,999 7.3 7.3 6.3 10.8 26.9
$10,000-$14,999 7.6 7.4 6.0 10.1 20.5
$15,000 or More 7.9 7.2 8.5 10.9 34.2
*The transit trip length figures, which are based on survey responses,
are considerably higher than those estimated by transit authorities or
reported in origin-destination travel demand studies. Transit commuters,
unlike automobile drivers, do not have odometers in front of them as they
travel.
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is questionable, particularly as the trip distances reported were not
actually measured but rather were approximated by each of the survey
respondents. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the anticipated relation-
ship is not fully confirmed.
Specific Geographic Routing: Rider incomes appear to vary consider-
ably according to the geographic portion of the transit system used. As
Table 2.7 indicates, the average annual earnings in 1970 of auto commuters
in metropolitan areas larger than 100,000 population were $7,598 as compared
with only $5,982 for mass transit commuters. The average earnings of long-
distance radial commuters living in the suburbs,however, were much higher
than those of non-radial commuters either within the suburbs or within the
central city. Indeed, transit riders commuting from the suburbs to down-
town jobs had the highest average earnings of any category ($10,589), even
higher than auto commuters making the same type of trip ($10,432). The
commuters with the lowest average earnings were transit riders who either
both lived and worked inside the central city or both lived and worked
in the suburbs ($5,099 and $4,011, respectively). It should not be Surpris-
ing, then, that subways and commuter railroads, which primarily provide
long-distance, radial service to the downtown area, are patronized more
heavily by the affluent than are inner-city or intra-suburban bus lines.
Incidentally, the statistics of Table 2.7 tend to contradict somewhat
the trip distance Figures of Table 2.6. Although Table 2.7 refers to
worktrips only and does not present precise estimates of length, it does
indicate that the most affluent workers are those commuting between the
suburbs and downtown, which presumably requires the longest trips. It is
conceivable, although unlikely, that intra-suburban transit trips are
Table 2.7 Average Annual Earnings of Workers Living in U.S. Metropolitan Areas with Population Abye
100,000 by Mode Used for Journey-to-Work, Place of Work, and Place of Residence In 1970
Average Annual Earnings of Workers Who
Principal All Live Inside the Central City Live Outside the Central City
Mode Used Workers
on Who Live Work Inside the Work in Work Work Inside the Work in Work
Journey- in SMSAs Central City SMSA Outside Central City SMSA Outside
to-Work Outside SMSA of Outside SMSA of
In CBD** Elsewhere C. City Residence* In CBD** Elsewhere C, City Residence*
All
Modes*** $ 7,557 $ 7,375 $ 6,402 $ 6,998 $ 8,097 $10,468 $ 8,386 $ 6,991 $ 9,326
Private
Automobile $ 7,598 $ 8,370 $ 7,089 $ 7,384 $ 8,397 $10,432 $ 8,515 $ 7,427 $ 9,111
Mass
Transport $ 5,982 $ 6,386 $ 5,099 $ 4,312 $ 7,267* $10,589 $ 7,998 $ 4,011 $12,692*
*Often these persons work in the central cities
in the Paterson-Clifton-Passaic, Newark, Jersey City,
SMSA of residence probably work in the New York City S
**Central business district.
of adjacent SMSAs, For example, many persons who live
Standford, or Norwalk SMSAs and work outside their
***Other modes besides private automobiles and mass transport include taxi, walking, and work at home.
WA
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longer on average. Similarly, cross-hauling within large central cities
can entail very long trips indeed. Thus, even Table 2.7 does not definitely
confirm the hypothesis that more affluent transit riders take longer trips.
Table 2.7 does, however, indicate that peak-direction commuters have much
higher incomes than do reverse commuters. Suburban residents headed for
downtown via transit during morning rush hours averaged $10,589 in earnings,
whereas central city residents making the reverse commute averaged only
$4,312.
In summary, transit riders in the U.S. have significantly lower
incomes on average than do automobile users. This is primarily due to the
very low incomes of bus passengers, who account for about 3/4 of all transit
patronage. Subway riders are spread evenly over the income distribution,
and commuter rail passengers are much more affluent than the users of any
other mode of urban transportation. Incomes of transit riders tend to be
higher for rush-hour trips than for off-peak trips, for peak-direction
trips than for reverse commuting, for suburb-to-downtown trips than for
intrasuburban or intra-central-city trips, and possibly for longer trips
than for shorter trips.
These income characteristics of transit riders are, of course, not
immutable. Although studies suggest that the distribution of transit
rider incomes relative to the distribution of auto user incomes has re-
mained roughly constant since 1963,12 it is certain that shifts in public
policy could significantly change this distribution. Discount transit
passes for the poor and improved bus service in low-income neighborhoods
would increase transit use at the lower end of the income spectrum. Such
a program could be financed by a reduction in the level of operating
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subsidies to commuter rail and rapid transit, which, moreover, would result
in fare increases and service cutbacks that would reduce the patronage of
many affluent riders. Similarly, fare surcharges for peak-direction
rush-hour trips would shift downward the relative income distribution of
transit riders.
The following chapters, however, do not speculate onthe precise
degree to which the income distribution would shift in response to various
policy changes. They attempt, rather, toassay the income-redistributional
impact of the current transit subsidy program given existing fare and
service levels and the present distribution of transit rider incomes.
This distributional impact is calculated on the basis of variations in the
extent to which different types of transit services are subsidized (both
explicitly and implicitly) and the corresponding variations in rider
incomes.
CHAPTER 3: THE DISTRIBUTION OF OPERATING SUBSIDIES AMONG TRANSIT RIDERS
In light of the difficulties of measuring the utility impacts of
transit subsidies, the benefit analysis of this study focuses on the
distribution of transit subsidy expenditures among income classes. In the
present chapter, the distribution of operating subsidies is estimated on
the basis of rider incomes and the differential degree of subsidization
of each type of transit service.
Trends in Transit Operating Subsidies
Public subsidization of transit operations in the United States
has grown dramatically in recent years. As shown in Figure 3.1, transit
operations as a whole were only marginally profitable even at the peak of
transit use in the 1940's. They became steadily less profitable during the
1950's and ran their first aggregate operating deficit in 1963. This deficit
continued to grow, but only slightly, over the remainder of the decade.
The initial response to transit's unprofitability involved service cutbacks
and fare hikes by the operators. Government financial assistance to offset
the deficit was minimal.1
Since 1970, however, public operating subsidies to mass transit have
increased faster than almost any other government program and have covered
virtually all of the operating deficit. Having grown by an average of
36% per year, these subsidies amounted to $2.2 billion in 1976.2
Modal Distribution of Operating Subsidies
As indicated in Table 3.1, roughly 56% of the total operating
39
Table 3.1 U.S, Aggregate Transit Operatin Statistics by Mode, 1973 - 1976
(In Millions, Except for Ratios?3
MODE
Statistic Bus and Streetcar Subway and Elevated Commuter Rail
1973 1974 1975 1976 1973 1974 1975 1976 1973 1974 1975 1976
Operating
Expense*($) 1,599 2,190 2,500 2,651 837 949 1,085 1,188 413 495 571 657
Operating
Revenue ($) 1,337 1,434 1,483 1,528 514 502 491 617 250 263 283 334
Operating
Deficit ($) 262 756 1,017 1,123 323 447 593 571 163 233 288 323
Operating Revenue/
Operating Expense .84 .65 .59 .58 .61 .53 .45 .52 .61 .53 .50 .51
Total Passengers 4,946 5,209 5,286 5,434 1,714 1,726 1,673 1,632 239 254 260 260
Operating Expense
per Passenger ($) .32 .42 .47 .49 .49 .55 .65 .73 1.73 1.95 2.20 2.52
Average Fare ($) .27 .28 .28 .28 .30 .29 .29 .38 1.05 1.05 1.09 1.28
Operating Deficit
per Passenger ($) .05 .14 .19 .21 .19 .26 .36 .35 .68 .92 1,11 1.24
*Includes taxes, excludes depreciation.
0:
Figure 3.1 The Growth in the Aggregate Transit Operating Deficit in the United States, 1940-19761
(In Millions of Dollars) *
Profit
500
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Profit 0Loss
250
500
750
19,000
1.,250
1,500
1 ,750
2,000
Loss
(76) (148) (66) (56) (30) (-10)
'65
(-289)
(-1,704)
(-19,860)
*The operating profit and loss figures do not include comuter rail, which is incorporated in aggregate
transit statistics elsewhere in this study.
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deficit is attributable to bus operations, 28% to rail rapid transit, and
16% to commuter rail. Although bus services thus receive most of the
operating subsidy, rail operations entail considerably higher deficits per
passenger trip. In 1976, for example, these amounted to an average of $1.24
per commuter rail passenger, 354 per rail rapid transit passenger, and
only 21t per bus passenger. Yet fare revenues covered only a slightly
higher percentage of operating expenses for bus service than for rail serv-
ices; most of the differences in per-passenger subsidies among modes are,
therefore, attributable to the large differences in operating expense
levels.* Because the income distribution of riders varies substantially
according to specific transit mode, this variation in degree of subsidiza-
tion significantly affects the overall distribution of transit subsidies
among income classes. Thus, bus riders, who have the lowest average
income, receive the least subsidy per trip, whereas commuter rail passengers,
who have much higher incomes on average, benefit from a per-trip subsidy
that is almost 6 times as large.
Variations in Subsidization Levels Among Cities
The variation in operating subsidy levels among modes is exceeded
by the variation in subsidy levels from one city to another. Among major
metropolitan areas, for example, the average operating subsidy per passenger
ranges from 134 in New Orleans to 90t in Boston (see Figure 3.2). In
general, Western cities have the highest per-passenger subsidies, and
*Of course, these statistics do not necessarily imply that the rail
services are less efficient modes than the bus. Commuter rail trips are
generally much longer than bus trips, and the quality of service is
normally higher. Similarly, subway costs are higher than bus costs per
passenger trip, but subway trips are longer and faster.
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Figure 3.2 Variation Among Metropolitan Areas in the Operating Subsidy per
Passenger Trip (Aggregate for All Transit Modes, 1976)4
Metropolitan Subsidy per Passenger (in cents)
Area 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Boston 9
Seattle 1 64
Denver j62
San Francisco 59
Los Angeles 51
Portland , 50
Kansas City i 45
Detroit 43
Philadelphia i 42
Minneapolis 41
Washington, D.C. ' 40
Cincinnati _ 39
St. Louis ' 38
Atlanta 38
New York 35
Cleveland 34
San Diego '34
Pittsburgh 31
Miami 24
Chicago 22
Dallas 22
Houston 20
Baltimore 17
Milwaukee 15
Buffalo 14
New Orleans 13
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Southern cities, the lowest. Similarly, there is considerable variation
among cities in the relative importance of fares in financing transit
operations. Farebox revenues covered only 1/4 of operating expenses in
Atlanta but almost 3/4 in Milwaukee (see Figure 3.3).
There is also a great deal of variation in the extent to which metro-
politan areas have committed public funds to transit subsidization relative
to their population size. As seen in Figure 3.4, for example, the rela-
tively transit-oriented cities of Boston,NewYork, and San Francisco devote
almost 10 times as much subsidy per capita to transit operations as do the
much more auto-oriented cities at the other end of the scale. Because the
income distribution of transit riders also varies from one type of metro-
politan area to another, significant redistributive consequences may result
in addition to those suggested by aggregate, nationwide statistics.
Implicit Variations in Subsidy Levels
The degree of transit subsidization also varies significantly by
time of day of use, direction of trip, length of trip, and geographit
portion of system used. Rush-hour trips implicitly are more subsidized
than off-peak trips. Peak-direction trips are more subsidized than trips in
the reverse direction. Long trips are more subsidized than short trips.
And inner-city trips tend to be less subsidized than those between the
suburbs and downtown. Each of these types of implicit subsidization will
be elucidated immediately below, but it should be kept in mind that, as
shown in the previous chapter, rider incomes vary along significantly
corresponding dimensions. Thus, the distributional impacts of the
variations in implicit subsidization may be substantial.
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Figure 3, 3 Variation Among Metropolitan .Areas in the Percentage of
Operating Expenses Covered by Fares (Aggregate for All
Transit Modes, 1976)5
Metropolitan Revenues/Expenses
Area .25 .30 .35 .40 .45 .50 .55 .60 .65 .70 .75
Atlanta
Seattle
Boston
Portland
Denver
Los Angeles
Cleveland
St. Louis
San Francisco
San Diego
Cincinnati
Minneapolis
Kansas City
Philadelphia
Miami
Detroit
Pittsburgh
Washington,
Houston
New Orleans
Chicago
New York
Baltimore
Dallas
Buffalo
Milwaukee
D.C,
I
1.26
I .29
.31
.31
1 .33
.34
.35
1 . 37
i~ 1.37
3 .40
i.40
~3 .41
~ .41
3.47
D .48
.51
lZ2.51
3.57
~ .58
~~J ,59
~~~J .60
S.62
1 .64
-I
-I
.67
.68
.72
4
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Figure 3,4 Variation Among Metropolitan Areas in the Annual Transit
Operating Subsidy per Capita, 19766
Metropolitan Subsidy per Capita (in dollars)
Area 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Boston
New York 146
San Francisco '44
Philadelphia 31
Atlanta 125
Chicago 124
Seattle 122
Washington, D.C. 21
Portland 21
Cleveland - 19
Pittsburgh i18
Denver 118
Minneapolis 115
Los Angeles 1 ,3
Miami i13
St. Louis 13
New Orleans 12
Baltimore 1
Cincinnati -11
San Diego 110
Detroit -9
Kansas City -> 8
Milwaukee 6
Buffalo 5
Houston 4
Dallas 
-4
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Virtually all major transit systems in the U.S. offer from 2 to 3
times as many vehicle miles of service per hour during weekday morning and
evening rush-hours as at other times.] Consequently, there is great
unevenness in the need for transit vehicle operators. Unfortunately,
transit management is constrained from adjusting efficiently to this peak-
ing of demand during rush-hours. Transit labor union contracts in virtually
all major metropolitan areas prohibit both the hiring of part-time operators
for rush-hour use and the splitting of work shifts. Thus a substantial
portion (from 1/2 to 2/3) of the transit labor force--hired primarily to
transport rush-hour commuters--remain idle during the interim off-peak
hours. As a result, overall labor productivity is lowered and labor cost
per passenger trip is increased. The true operating cost of transit
service--of which about 80% is labor cost8--is, therefore, much higher
in peak hours than in off-peak hours. Since most transit systems do not
impose a fare surcharge for rush-hour use, peak-hour users are, in effect,
subsidized by off-peak users.**
Peak-direction trips tend to be more expensive than reverse-flow
trips, primarily due to congestion on peak-flow lanes and tracks, which
slows down transit vehicles and thus increases operating cost per vehicle
mile. Fare structure almost never take this difference into account, so
that peak-direction travelers are implicitly more subsidized than reverse-
flow travelers.
*Lower bus speeds due to rush-hour street congestion further increase
the cost of rush-hour bus trips relative to off-peak trips by reducing the
number of vehicle miles driven per employee.
**Indeed, coninuter rail operations typically offer discounts to
regular, peak-hour riders.
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Similarly, transit users making long trips are implicitly subsidized
by riders making short trips if fare structure-Sdo not fully incorporate
the higher cost of serving longer trips. Although commuter rail fares are
finely gradated by trip distance, fares on other transit modes usually are
not. Some bus and subway systems do employ zone fare structures or transfer
fees, which impose surcharges on longer trips, but these mechanisms are
so crude in most cities that they do not adequately reflect the distance
of rides.
Suburban transit routes are typically characterized by much lower
load factors than are inner-city routes. Thus, although operating costs
per vehicle mile are lower in the suburbs due to faster travel speeds,
operating costs per passenger are higher on suburban routes. For example,
a study of the new rail rapid transit system in Washington, D.C. indicates
that the operating deficit per passenger will be almost 10 times as great
for outer suburban portions as for inner-city portions ($1.23 vs. 13t).9
Implicit cross-subsidization occurs if fares do not vary by this geographic
dimension as well.
The Assignment of Operating Subsidies to Income Classes
The preceding sections established the considerable variation in the
degree of subsidization according to mode, type of city, length of trip,
and geographic location of trip. This section compares this variation
in subsidy levels with the corresponding variation in rider incomes
established in Chapter 2 to estimate the distribution of operating subsidies
in 1975 among income classes.
Table 3.2 presents rough estimates of this distribution based on
modal differences in subsidization and rider incomes. Subsidies here are
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Table 3,2 The Distribut on of Transit Operating Subsidies Among Income
Classes, 1975
Income Classes*** Total, All
Type of Subsidy Below $7,500, $15,000- $22,500 Income
$7,500 $14,999 $22,499 or More Classes"
Bus and Streetcar
($000)* 378,542 419,615 182,055 128,711 1,110,094
Rail Rapid Transit
($000)* 88,422 253,989 125,214 125,214 593,432
Commuter Rail ($000)* 0 101,041 113,995 72,542 287,867
Total Operating
Deficit, All Transit
Modes ($000)**** 466,964 774,645 421,264 326,527 1,991,393
Percentage Distribution
of Total Deficit**** 23.5% 38.9% 21.2% 16.4% 100%
Percentage Distribution
of Households 28.4% 30.9% 23.0% 17.6% 100%
Average Subsidy per
Household**** $36.94 $54.17 $36.95 $35.01 $41.77
*The amount of the deficit assigned to each income class equals the
total deficit for each mode multiplied by the percentage of that mode's
riders belonging to the indicated income class.
**The sum of each row does not exactly equal the total subsidy to each
mode due to rounding error.
***These categories are the 1970 income classes of the NPTS survey ad-
justed to account for the growth in personal income between 1970 and 1975.
****When modifications in the above estimates are made to account for
operating subsidies accruing to transit laborers in the form of excessive
wage increases, the following distributions result:
Total Operating
Deficit ($000) 374,449 1,017,995 337,011 261,222 1,991,394
Percentage Distribution
of Total Deficit 18.8% 51.1% 16.9% 13.1% 100%
Average Subsidy per
Household $29.62 $71.19 $29.56 $28.01 $41.77
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allocated to each income class in direct proportion to the percentage of
patronage its travelers accounted for on each mode. The resulting distri-
bution is quite similar to the corresponding distribution of households
by income class. The lowest income group, however, received somewhat less
than its share of the subsidy, and the $7,500-$14,999 group received consid-
erably more than its share. Households in this class benefited from an
average subsidy of $54 as opposed to only about $36 for the other income
classes.
The subsidy expenditure distribution would have been even less
favorable to the lowest income group if implicit cross-subsidization had
been incorporated in the estimates. For example, peak-hour trips are
implicitly more subsidized than off-peak trips; because the incomes of
transit riders are much higher during rush hours than non-rush hours,
low-income transit riders are less subsidized than affluent riders.
Similarly, peak-direction trips are most expensive to serve due to the
congestion on peak-bound lanes, tracks, and transit vehicles. Affluent
transit passengers, who primarily make peak-direction trips during rush
hour, are therefore more subsidized than low-income passengers, who account
for most of the reverse commuters during rush hour. Since suburban transit
routes (and suburban portions of routes extending into downtown) similarly
are more unprofitable than inner-city routes, affluent riders are more
subsidized on this score as well. It is also probable, although difficult
to document, that average transit trip lengths are greater for affluent
riders; in effect, then, the longer trips of the well-to-do are cross-
subsidized by the short trips of low-income users. Of course, transit
fare structures could be adapted to reflect these cost differentials and
thus to neutralize their income distributional impact. Presently, however,
fares do not incorporate the cost differences, so that the distributional
impact is now significantly perverse. In short, these considerations suggest
that the subsidy distribution estimated in Table 3.5 should probably be
considered an upper bound on the degree to which subsidies accrue to poor
riders relative to affluent riders.
Moreover, as argued in Chapter 1, the non-rider benefits of transit
subsidies accrue even less to low-income classes than do rider benefits.
In the case of operating subsidies, these non-rider benefits redound primarily
to employees of transit systems. If the 20% of the operating subsidy
attributable to excessive wage increases is assigned to these transit
workers (and only 80% of the total assigned to riders), then the overall
subsidy distribution is even more concentrated in the $7,500-$14,999 category.*
Indeed, as shown at the bottom of Table 3.5, this class receives about
60% of the total subsidy (although it accounts for only 31% of all house-
holds) and more than 3 times as much subsidy per household as the other 3
income groupings. In this light, the operating subsidy program appears
to have very little at all to do with relieving poverty, but rather
represents a substantial income supplement to the lower middle class.
Whatever tne overall impact of the subsidy program nationwide,
the variation in distributional impact from one metropolitan area to
another is striking. As shown in Figure 3.4, there are substantial differ-
ences among cities in the degree to which they devote public funds to
*The average salary of transit workers in 1975 was $13,993.11 Thus,
benefits to this group were assigned to the $7,500-$14,999 category. The
highest-paid transit workers, of course, made more tnan $15,000, but it was
not possible to obtain data on the full distribution of transit worker
incomes.
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subsidizing transit operations. There are corresponding differences in
the relative incomes of transit-riders--primarily due to differences in
the types of transit serivces offered (see Table 2.3). Combining the
rider income and per capita subsidy data, Figure 3.5 indicates that transit
tends to be most heavily subsidized--and hence of highest quality--in metro-
politan areas where transit riders are most affluent relative to auto
drivers.
On the basis of subsidy expenditures, therefore, it is very difficult
to argue that the operating subsidy program is designed primarily to benefit
the poor.
Figure 3.5 Relationship Between Relative Transit Rider Incomes and Per-Capita Level of Transit
Subsidization in Each Metropolitan Areall
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CHAPTER 4: THE DISTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL SUBSIDIES AMONG TRANSIT RIDERS
Only a minor percentage of the nationwide subsidy to transit opera-
tions in 1975 was in fact devoted to services used by the poor; most of
this subsidy accrued to the lower middle class. The overall impact of
transit subsidization, of course, depends also on the distribution of
capital subsidies, which are roughly equal in total magnitude to operating
subsidies.
Trends in Capital Subsidization
The transit capital subsidy program in the United States has grown
dramatically since 1965, when the Federal government first became actively
involved in efforts to rehabilitate the declining transit industry (see
Figure 4.1). Amounting to only $76 million in 1965, capital subsidies
had increased to almost $2 billion by 1976, only 10% less than the operating
subsidy total. Whereas the most rapid growth in the operating subsidy
programs occurred from 1972 to 1975, capital subsidies increased fastest
from 1974 to 1973. The rate of growth of both programs has leveled off
recently, largely due to the general fiscal austerity at all levels of
government.
Modal Distribution of Capital Subsidies
In contrast to operating subsidies, capital subsidies have been
devoted primarily to rail transit services. Since 1965, 77% of the total
cumulative transit capital subsidy has been spent on rail rapid transit
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Figure 4.1 The Growt; in Transit Capital Subsidies Relative to the Growth in Transit Operating Subsidies,*
1965-1976'
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and commuter rail programs, as opposed to 45% of the total operating
subsidy (compare Table 4.1 with Table 3.1). This percentage has been
declining, however, and by 1975 had fallen to 68% (see Table 4.2).
Because the incomes of rail transit passengers are considerably
higher than those of bus riders, the resulting distribution of capital
subsidies among income classes has been even less favorable to the poor
than the distribution of operating subsidies. It is more difficult, how-
ever, to assign precise capital subsidy amounts among income groups than it
is to apportion operating subsidies, which produce benefits almost exclus-
ively during the year of subsidization. The capital study program, in
contrast, finances investments in right-of-way and vehicles, which yield
benefits over a much longer period of time. Thus, the relevant income
distribution for capital subsidy assignment is that of future rather than
current transit users.
The Income Distribution for Capital Subsidy Apportionment
The incomes of future transit riders obviously cannot be predicted
with certainty. An educated guess, however, is probably more useful in this
case than a profession of total ignorance. For example, it is quite likely
that the relative incomes of bus riders and commuter rail passengers will
remain roughly the same. Capital investments in these modes have focused
primarily on improving the quality of service on existing routes rather
than substantially expanding or altering the nature of the services currently
offered. Roughly half of the rapid transit subsidy, in contrast, has been
devoted to the construction of new systems or lines. In terms of distances
There is, moreover, the problem of how precisely to amortize bene-
fits over future years and what discount rate should be used to make future
benefits comparable with current benefits.
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Table 4,1 Transit Capital Grants b Mode, Cumulative from 1965 tQ 1977
(in Millions of Dollars)
Government Level
Rapid Transit*
Federal State and Local
Section 3 $3,031.8 $ 919.4
Urban Systems 49.2 12.3
Interstate Transfers 857.7 214.4
Special D.C. Metro
Program 1,231.0 804,5
Local BART Funds
(prior to Federal match) 0 976,0
Total Rapid Transit 5,169.7 (62%) 2,926.6 (77%)
Commuter Rail
Section 3 839.6 209.9
Interstate Transfers 140.1 35.0
Total Commuter Rail 979,7 (12%) 244.9 ( 6%)
Bus**
Section 3 2,108.4 610.4
Section 5 59.2 14.8
Urban Systems 24.0 6.0
Total Bus 2,191.6 (26%) 631,2 (17%)
Total, All Modes*** $8,341.0 (100%) $3,802.7 (100%)
*Includes light-rail lines
**Includes trolley coaches but not streetcars,
***This total does not include capital subsidies to ferries, personal
rapid transit, inclines, or cable cars.
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Table 4,2 Transit Capital Grants by Mode, Federal Fiscal Year 1975
(in Millions of Dollars)
Government Level
Rapid Transit*
Federal State and Local
Section 3
Urban Systems
Interstate Transfers
Special D.C. Metro
Program
Total Rapid Transit
$ 532,6
10,0
65,7
126.9
735.2 (55%)
$133,2
2,5
16.4
106.3
258.4 (63%)
Commuter Rail
Section 3
Interstate Transfers
Total Commuter Rail
147,6
0
147.6
36,9
0
36,9(11%) ( 9%)
Bus**
Section 3 430,3 107,6
Section 5 9,1 2,3
Urban Systems 5.7 6.0
Total Bus 445,1 (34%) 111.3 (27%)
Total, All Modes*** $1,327.9 (100%) $406.6 (100%)
*Includes light-rail lines
**Includes trolley coaches but not streetcars
***This total does not include capital subsidies to ferries, personal
rapid transit, inclines, or cable cars.
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between stops, areas served, feeder and distributor characteristics, and
ride quality, these new systems will be hybrids of conventional subway-
elevated systems and commuter rail. Thus, one might expect the income
distribution of future rapid transit riders to be higher than that of
current riders.
A 1975 survey of the passengers on the new Bay Area Rapid Transit
System (BART) in the San Francisco area revealed the distribution shown
in Table 4.3 While the average income of BART riders clearly is higher
Table 4.3 The Income Distribution of BART Riders Relative to
that of the General Population in the San Francisco Area 4
Income Class
Under $5,000
$5,000 - $6,999
$7,000 - $9,999
$10,000 -$14,999
$15,000 -$24,999
$25,000 or more
Percentage of Total
Riders (1975)
10.5%
6.8%
12.6%
21.6%
30.6%
17.8%
Percentage of All
Households (1970)
22.9%
9.8%
16.9%
25.6%
19.3%
5.6%
than that of the population as a whole, it is an extreme exaggeration to
claim on the basis of these figures--as some have5--that only the wealthy
ride BART. Moreover, if the 1970 household income figures were adjusted to
control for growth in personal income between 1970 and 1975, the discrepancy
between the incomes of BART riders and the general population would have
been considerably smaller. Similarly, if the 1970 NPTS transit rider
income figures of Table 2.1 are adjusted to account for economic growth
and inflation, the income.distribution of riders of older rapid transit
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lines is not strikingly different (see Table 4.4). Indeed, although BART
does derive proportionally more of its patronage from the most affluent
income groups, the differences are not great. Moreover, a slightly higher
percentage of BART's riders come from the poorest income class. The main
difference appears to be that BART is much less used by lower-middle-class
riders than are conventional systems; upper-middle-class riders evidently
have taken their place.
The criticism of BART as the mode of the rich has, moreover, prompted
modifications of other new rail systems which almost certainly will enable
these to attract more low-income passengers. Thus, it is unlikely that
the income distribution of future rail rapid transit riders relative to
the general population will be very different in aggregate than the current
*
one.
Table 4.4. Income Distribution of the Riders of Older Rapid
Transit Systems as Adjusted to Control for Income
Growth Since 1970.6
Income Class Percent of Riders
Under $4,500 6.7%
$4,500 - $8,999 19.8%
$9,000 -$14,999 30.2%
$15,000 - $22,499 21.1%
$22,500 or more 21.1%
Assignment of Capital Subsidies Among Classes
Notwithstanding the somewhat less clear interpretation of the resulting
*At maximum, the new systems in San Francisco, Washington, Atlanta,
and Baltimore will account for about 10% of total rapid transit passengers
nationwide, so that any income differences would, at any rate, have negligible
impact on the national income distribution of rapid transit riders. 7
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estimates, capital subsidies can be allocated among income classes just
as in the case of operating subsidies. The resulting apportionment, however,
must be thought of as representing the distribution of the eventual, long-
term stream of benefits rather than of current benefits, as in the case
of operating subsidies.
Table 4.5 presents the distribution of capital subsidies among
income classes when these are allocated according to the proportion of
total riders on each mode accounted for by each class.* Compared with the
distribution of operating subsidies (see Table 3.5), capital subsidies
accrue in greater proportion to affluent riders and in lesser proportions
to the low-income classes.** As in the case of operating subsidies--although
to a lesser degree--households in the $7,500-$14,999 income category, obtain
the largest subsidy ($45). In contrast, the poorest class (less than $7,500)
receives the least subsidy per household ($28).
Implicit Variations in Capital Subsidy Levels
In evaluating the distribution of operating subsidies, it was argued
that, for a number of reasons, the true distribution of subsidies was even
less favorable to the poor than was the estimated one. This is also the
case for- capital subsidies.
*Note that half of the rapid transit subsidy has been distributed
according to BART rider incomes, and half according to the income distribution
of riders of old rapid transit systems. This is the approximate breakdown
of rail rapid transit capital subsidies between new systems and old systems.
**If compared with the modified table at the bottom of Table 3.5, a
greater percentage of capital subsidies go to the bottom class than is the
case for operating subsidies--when benefits to transit employees are incor-
porated. This comparison is not appropriate, however; non-rider beneficiaries
of capital subsidies (CBD landowners, businessmen) almost certainly have
higher incomes on average than do transit employees. Thus, a similar modi-
fication of Table 4.5 would probably result in a lower proportion of the
capital subsidy accruing to the poor than does the modified operating
subsidy table.
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Table 4,5 The Distribution of Capital Subsidies Among Income Classes,
19758
Income Classes*** Total, All
Type of Subsidy Below $7,500- $15,000 $22,500 Income
$7,500 $14,999 $22,499 or more
Bus and Streetcar
($000)* 189,700 2103300 91,200 64,500 566,400
Rail Rapid Transit
($000)* 170,402 367,135 219,089 231,012 993,600
Commuter Rail ($000)* 0 64,760 73,062 46,494 184,500
Total Capital Subsidy,
All Transit Modes
($000) 360,102 642,195 383,351 342,006 1,734,500
Percentage Distribution
of Total Subsidy 20.8% 37.2% 22.2% 19.8% 100%
Percentage Distribution
of Households 28,4% 30,9% 23.0% 17,6% 100%
Average Subsidy
per Household $28.49 $44.91 $33.63 $36,67 $36.38
*The amount of the capital subsidy assigned to
equals the total subsidy for each mode multiplied by
that mode's riders belonging to the indicated income
each income class
the percentage of
class. For rail
rapid transit, half of the subsidy was assigned on the basis of the income
distribution of riders of old rail rapid transit systems, and half on the
basis of the incomes of riders of new rapid transit systems,
**The sum of each row does not exactly equal the total subsidy to each
mode due to rounding error.
***These categories are the 1970 income classes of the NPTS travel
survey adjusted to account for the growth in personal income between
1970 and 1975.
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As has already been documented in Chapter 2, transit rider incomes,
on average, are considerably higher during peak hours than during off-peak
hours, on peak-direction lanes and tracks than on those going in the
reverse direction, on long trips than on short trips (probably), and on
suburban portions of radial routes than on inner-city routes. These types
of usage--dominated by relatively affluent riders--also incur the highest
levels of capital cost per passenger trip.
For example, since the frequency of transit service is from 2 to 3
times greater during rush hours than off-peak hours, 1/2 to 2/3 of transit
vehicle capital cost can be exclusively attributed to peak-hour users. 9
Moreover, many high-capacity rapid transit lines have been built primarily
to serve the high passenger volumes at rush hour. Considerably less expen-
sive bus services in most instances would have sufficed to carry the lower,
off-peak passenger volumes. Thus, a disproportionate share of the transit
capital subsidy is devoted to serving the needs of rush-hour commuters
with relatively high incomes. For similar reasons, peak-direction transit
riders necessitate particularly high capital costs per trip. The true
cost of reverse commuting, in contrast,.is much lower since the backhauling
would occur at any rate. Yet reverse commuters, who have incomes only
about half those of peak-direction commuters (see Table 2.7), pay the
same fares as peak-direction commuters. Relatively high-income peak-
direction rush-hour commuters, therefore, are significantly cvoss-
subsidized by relatively low-income reverse commuters and off-peak riders.
To the extent that high-income transit riders make longer trips than low-
income riders or make their trips over portions of the system where load-
factors are below average (as is undoubtedly the case for suburban services
in most areas), these high-income users receive greater subsidies per
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trip than do low-income users, provided fare structures do not fully reflect
these cost differences--as, of course, they almost never do.
Thus, the true distribution of capital subsidy expenditures among
income classes is probably much less favorable to the poor than indicated
by the estimates of Table 4.5, which--due to data limitations--do not
reflect the impacts of cross-subsidization within modes. There is yet
another reason, however, to believe that these estimates overstate the pro-
portion of the capital subsidy accruing to the poor. Downtown landowners
and businesses benefit considerably from the operation of transit services
focusing on the central business district, and, in particular, from rail
rapid transit systems radiating out from downtown.* To the extent that
these non-rider beneficiaries reap higher rents or increased profits
that are not offset by value-capture property taxation, the overall distri-
bution of capital subsidies is more heavily concentrated among the upper-
income classes than the distribution of rider benefits alone.
In contrast to operating subsidies, these non-rider benefits of
capital subsidies are additions to those for riders, not competitors for
them.
CHAPTER 5: THE DISTRIBUTION OF SUBSIDY EXPENDITURES AND THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE BENEFITS OF TRANSIT SUBSIDIES AMONG INCOME CLASSES
Although subsidy expenditures bear an uncertain relation to the true
utility impacts of transit subsidization, the distribution of these expendi-
tures throws considerable light on the extent to which the transit subsidy
program has been designed with the primary intention of aiding the poor.
Expenditures, of course, are not an adequate proxy for actual benefits,
but they quite accurately reflect how public resources have in fact been
devoted to types of transit that differentially serve different income
classes.
The Distribution of Subsidy Expenditures
The sum of the distributions of operating and capital transit sub-
sidies in 1975 is presented in Table 5.1. According to this summary
distribution, the poorest income class (below $4,500) received by far
the lowest subsidy per household ($42) while the largest subsidies accrued
to the $4,500-$8,999 and $9,000-$15,000 classes ($99 and $113 per house-
hold, respectively). Although households earning more than $15,000
received subsidies $14 less than the average for all classes, these subsidies
nevertheless exceeded by $22 those for the poorest class, whose subsidy per
household was only half of the overall average.
Even before considering intramodal variations in subsidization
levels, therefore, the overall distribution of transit subsidy expenditures
appears to be quite unfavorable to the poor. When account is taken of the
significantly greater subsidization--within each modal grouping--of
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Table 5,1 The Distribution of Operating and Capital Transit Subsidies
Among Income Classes, 19751 (Subsidy Amounts in Millions of
Dollars)
Income Class*** Total, All
Type of Subsidy Below $4,500- $9,000- $15,000- $22,500 Income
$4,500 $8,999 $14,999 $22,499 or More
Operating Subsidy,
Total 163 391 837 337 262 1,991
Bus and Streetcar* 131 286 444 146 103 1,110
Rail Rapid Transit* 32 94 267 100 100 593
Commuter Rail* 0 12 127 91 58 288
Capital Subsidy,
Total 157 372 473 383 342 1,735
Bus and Streetcar 82 179 139 91 65 556
Rail Rapid Transit 75 184 278 219 231 994
Commuter Rail 0 9 55 73 46 185
Total Transit Subsidy 320 763 1,310 720 604 3,726
Bus and Streetcar 213 465 583 237 168 1,666
Rail Rapid Transit 107 278 545 319 331 1,587
Commuter Rail 0 21 182 164 104 473
Average Subsidy per
Household $42.02 $99.25 $112.53 $63.14 $64976 $78.17
*These operating subsidy distributions are based on the modified
distributions at the bottom of Table 3.2. They thus assume that roughly
20% of the total operating subsidy accrues to transit workers.
**The sum of each row does not exactly equal the total subsidy to
each mode due to rounding error.
***These categories are the 1970 income classes of the NPTS survey
adjusted to account for the growth in personal income between 1970 and 1975.
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relatively affluent rush-hour commuters heading for downtown* and making
long trips on radial lines from the suburbs, the actual distribution of
subsidy expenditures is even less favorable to the poor than that estimated
on the basis of intermodal differences in subsidization and rider incomes.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that anyone could have seriously believed
the transit subsidy program to be one designed primarily for the benefit
of the poor. Neither, however, would it be accurate to characterize the
subsidies as flowing primarily to the affluent. Rather, households earning
between $4,500 and $15,000 are the main beneficiaries, receiving 56% of
the total subsidy although they account for only 41% of all households.
Expenditures and True Benefits
Estimating actual utility impacts of transit subsidies is not
feasible given the theoretical complexities, practical measurement problems,
and data limitations discussed in Chapter 1 and Appendix A. However, it is
possible to establish, at least qualitatively, the relation between the
distribution of true benefits and the distribution of subsidy expenditures.
On the basis of this relation, bounds can be set on the probable distribution
of true benefits.
Establishment of the relation involves two steps. First, one must
determine how the objective impact of the subsidies has varied from one
type of subsidy to another. How efficient, in other words, have the
various subsidies been, relative to each other, in producing more or
better transportation services? How many additional passenger miles of
*
Heading for downtown during morning rush hours and leaving it
during evening rush hours.
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service has each type of subsidy financed per dollar of expenditure
relative to other types--and at what levels of speed, comfort, reliability,
and safety? Second, one must establish the probable variation among income
classes in the relation between each unit of additional objective output
and the subjective benefit this represents to transit users in each class.
Most studies suggest that those portions of the transit subsidy pro-
gram most benefiting the affluent are the least efficient at improving
or augmenting transportation service. For example, the new rapid transit
systems in San Francisco and Washington will have cost at least $8 billion
when completed and fully operational. 2 Technical and economic assessments
of the systems indicate that bus services could have easily handled
realistic projections of passenger volumes at comparable speeds at only
a small fraction of the cost of the rail systems.3 Similar conclusions
have been reached with respect to the cost-effectiveness of other new
rapid transit systems and extensions of older systems.4 Thus, although
the affluent may receive most of the benefits of expensive new rapid
transit service, the benefit/cost ratios of such projects are so loy
that subsidy expenditures vastly overstate the real benefits accruing to
the affluent riders in terms of actual improvements in transportation
service. In contrast, the bus services most patronized by the poor
are generally believed to be quite cost-effective.
Whatever the actual transportation impacts of the subsidy, it is
also likely that, per unit of objective service output, the subjective
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welfare impact on the poor is greater than that on the affluent, for the
poor can least afford the alternatives to transit. This is particularly
so in the inner city, where poor transit users disproportionately live.
The costs of auto ownership and operation there are higher than in the
suburbs. Theft rates, property taxes, and maintenance costs for autos
are abnormally high in low-income areas, and parking and mandatory insurance
coverage are either very expensive or simply unavailable. Not only are the
costs of any given level of automotive service, therefore, more expensive
for the poor,* but any given level of automobile cost is, of course, a
greater burden for the poor. Consequently, it is not surprising that only
one-third of central-city households earning less than $3,000 in 1974
had an automobile. In contrast, 96% of American household earning
$15,000 or more had at least one car. 5 Similarly, although taxi seriice
is an alternative to transit for many urban poor, it is a relatively expen-
sive one. In short, the pooraremore dependent on transit than other
groups* and would suffer relatively more than high-income users from
comparable reductions in transit availability.
Thus, although the transit subsidy program clearly has not been
designed primarily to benefit the poor, the subsidy expenditures that are
in fact spent on services most used by the poor probably have the greatest
welfare impact per dollar.*** This does not deny the inequitable arrange-
ment of the current subsidy program; nor does it suggest the modifications
*
Controlling for vehicle quality and miles of travel.
See the incidence rates of Tiable 2.2.
That is, the qreatest deqree of true benefit or utility impact
per dollar of subsidy expenditure.
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should not be made to improve the distributional impact. It does indicate,
however, that transit service is especially important to those inner-city
riders who are forced to use it, and that curtailment of inner-city bus
services, in particular, might cause severe hardships for poor users.
PART II: THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE TAX COSTS OF
TRANSIT SUBSIDIES AMONG INCOME CLASSES
The net distributional impact of the transit subsidy program depends
not only on the distribution of the benefits of subsidization, but also on
the distribution of the tax burden arising from the government financing of
the subsidies. Although the poor receive a disproportionately small percent-
age of the total subsidy, they also contribute a disproportionately small per-
centage of the total tax revenues raised to finance them. Conversely, the
most affluent classes receive larger subsidies per household than the poor,
but this relative advantage is offset by their much larger tax contribution.
The distribution of tax costs among income classes is influenced by
a number of factors. Because the incidence patterns of different types of
taxes vary considerably, the overall incidence of transit financing depends to
a significant extent on the composition of transit tax revenues by type of
tax. Moreover, effective incidence can vary substantially depending on
the level of government at which the tax is levied, the inclusiveness of
the base relevant to each tax, and the jurisdictional coverage of the tax.
In assessing the distribution of the tax burden of transit subsidization,
therefore, examination of these dimensions of transit financing is essential.
Trends in transit financing and a detailed description of its
current composition are presented in Chapter 6, which immediately follows.
On the basis of these compositional data, available national estimates
of the incidence of various types of taxes at different levels of government
are weighted and aggregated in Chapter 7 to calculate the overall incidence
of taxation for public support of transit.
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CHAPTER 6: TRANSIT FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES
Since 1970, public subsidization of transit has grown from only
$541 million to more than $4 billion. This growth has obviously required
a correspondingly rapid increase in tax revenues raised to support transit
subsidization. As the public burden of transit finance has increased,
the composition of government funding has changed substantially. In con-
sequence, the overall incidence of transit finance taxation has been
considerably altered.
Trends in Transit Finance
As they have grown in absolute magnitude, the burdens of funding
both operating and capital transit subsidies have been shifted to successively
higher.levels of government. The statutory Federal share of capital subsidy
funding, for example, increased from 67% in 1970 to 80% in 1974, and pending
legislation would increase the proportion still further.* The Federal
share of operating subsidies, although significantly less, has also
increased, from 0% in 1973 to 22% in 1976 (see Table 6.1). In contrast,
the local share of operations financing fell from 34% to only 20% over
the same period. Although the corresponding shares of state and regional
levels of government remained roughly constant (23% and 27%, respectively),
together they funded 51% of the absolute increase in the total government
operating subsidy. Indeed, from 1973 to 1975, state and regional aid was
The Federal share of the Interstate Transfer portion of the capital
subsidy program would be increased from 80% to 90%, thus raising the overall
Federal share of the transit capital subsidy program to about 83%.
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Table 6.1 Sources of Transit Operating Subsidies, Aggregate for 26
Large U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 1973-1976 2
(Amounts in Thousands of Dollars, Percentages in Parentheses)
Year
Type of Funding 1973** 1974 1975 1976
Total Go~ernment Aid 694,923 1,103,906 1,563,515 1,805,750(83.7) (90.3) (92.4) (91.9)
Federal 0 42,241 282,290 422,470
(0) (3.5) (16.7) (21.5)
189,652 361,682 440,984 431,656State (2.8) (29.6) (26.0) (22.0)
Regional** 221,195 305,979 471,134 553,695(26.7) (25.0) (27.8) (28.2)
283,446 294,004 371,949 397,828Local (34.2) (32.2) (21.9) (20.2)
Other Sources, Total 135,135 118,795 128,578 159,588(16.3) ( 9.7) ( 7.6) ( 8.1)
Bridge and Tunnel. 120,036 99,216 106,554 133,152
Tolls (14.4) ( 8.1) ( 6.3) ( 6.8)
Cross-subsidies from 10,596 13,877 10,858 11,192
Utility Operations ( 1.3) ( 1.1) ( .6) ( .6)
Cross-subsidies from 4,503 5,702 11,166 15,244
Freight Operations ( .5) ( .5) ( .7) ( .8)
Total Transit Operating 830,058 1,222,701 1,694,898 1,965,338
Subsidies (100) (100)- (100) (100)
*See Table 2.3 fora listing of these metropolitan areas.
The 1973 totals do not include San Francisco, Washington, or Denver.
Funding was classified as regional if there existed an explicit (or
nearly so) metropolitan-wide transit financing mechanism. Uniform county
taxes were classified as regional provided the county was large enough
to include most of the metropolitan area.
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most responsible for relieving the burden of operating support at the
local level. Subsequently, however, the Federal aid has been the primary
source of this relief and has sharply curtailed the previously rapid
growth in state and regional subsidization.
The shifting composition of government support has significantly
increased the progressity of the overall tax structure financing the sub-
sidy program. Increased Federal subsidization, for example, has been
financed primarily by income taxation, which is generally believed to be
mildly progressive for most income groups, but especially favorable to the
poor, who pay little income tax, if any at all. The diminishing need for
local tax support of transit has also increased overall progressity. Not
only has this shift reduced the reliance of transit financing on increases
in the relatively regressive property tax, but it has done so primarily
in large, old central cities, where incomes are relatively low and tax
bases have been declining. Even the shift to state and regional financing
may have increased progressivity. Although these levels rely on generally
regressive sales taxation, their increased support has shifted much of
the burden fo transit subsidization from the central city to the suburbs,
where incomes, on average, are much higher. The overall progressity of
transit taxation, therefore, almost certainly has been increasing.*
Finally, there has been a strong trend toward earmarking certain
taxes specifically for transit use. Primarily involving percentages of
the sales tax at the state or regional level, this earmarking effectively
insulates such transit taxes from regular budgetary review. It also
ensures dependable growth in transit fund revenues in coming years
Alternatively, the overall regressivity has been decreasing.
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because sales tax proceeds automatically increase with inflation and
economic growth. To the extent that this growth increases the share of
the non-Federal funding borne by the suburbs, it suggests--together with
proposed increases in Federal funding--the continuing evolution of succes-
sively more progressive financing in the future.*
Geographic Variations in Transit Financing
The effective incidence of transit financing varies considerably
from one region to another as well as among metropolitan areas in the same
region. As shown in Table 6.2, even the relative importance of Federal aid
varies among regions, accounting for only 17% of the total operating subsidy
in the South as opposed to 29% in the Great Lakes region. Variations in
other types of government aid are more striking. State aid, for example,
is virtually nonexistent in the South and negligible in the West, whereas
it accounts for about 30% of the total subsidy in the Northeast and
Interior Rivers regions. Regional funding is extremely important in the
Great Lakes, West, and South (49% to 57% of the total subsidy) but ,much
less significant in the Interior Rivers and Northeast cities. Accounting
for 18% to 25% of funding in all other regions, local taxation finances
only 3% of the operating deficit in the Great Lakes area. Note also the
variation in the relative importance of tolls and cross-subsidies, 81%
of which are concentrated in the New York metropolitan area.
Variation among specific metropolitan areas is even greater (see
Figure 6.1). The percentage of total operating subsidies covered by the
*
In almost every case where such earmarked taxes have been adopted,
their jurisdictional coverage has included suburban areas.
76
Table 6.2. Sources of Transit Operating Subsidies for 26 Large Metropolitan
Areas, Aggregated by Region, 1976
(Amounts in Thousands of Dollars, Percentages in Parentheses)3
Region*
Type of Great Interior Total, All
Funding Northeast Lakes Rivers South West Regions
Total Govern- 1,019,050 300,432 117,788 58,307 310,173 1,805,70
ment Aid (88.7) (98.0) (100) (83.9) (96.3) (91.9)
Federal 243,228 88,382 25,169 11,537 54,154 422,470
(21.2) (28.8) (21.4) (16.6) (16.8) (21.5)
State 332,484 49,637 37,153 84 12,298 431,656
(28.9) (16.2) (31.5) (0) ( 3.8) (22.0)
Regional 156,085 152,723 27,841 33,971 183,075 553,695
(13.6) (49.8) (23.6) (48.9) (56.8) (28.2)
Local 287,253 9,690 27,625 12,614 60,646 397,282
(25.0) ( 3.2) (23.5) (18.1) (18.8) (20.2)
Other Sources, 130,353 6,057 0 11,192 11,986 159,588
Total (11.3) ( 2.0) (0) (16.1) ( 3.7) ( 8.1)
Bridges and 130,353 0 0 0 2,799 133,152
Tunnel Tolls (11.3) (0) (0) (0) ( .8) (-6.8)
Cross-sub-
sidies from 0 0 0 11,192. 0 11,192
Utility ((0) (0) (0) (16.1) (0) (.6)
Operations
Cross-sub-
sidies from 0 6,057 0 0 9,187 15,244
Freight (0) ( 2.0) (0) (0) (2.8) (.8)
Operations
Total Transit
Operating 1,149,403 306,489 117,788 64,499 334,145 1,965,338
Subsidies (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
The Northeast region is defined to include Boston, New York, Phila-
delphia, Baltimore and Washington. The Great Lakes cities include Buffalo,
Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, and Milwaukee. The Interior River cities
include Kansas City, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and Minneapolis-
St. Paul. The South includes Miami, Houston, Dallas, Atlanta, and New
Orleans. The West includes Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle,
Portland and Denver.
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Figure 6.1 Variation Among Metropolitan Areas in the Relat ve Importance
of Federal and State Operating Subsidies (1975)
State and Federal Assistance as a Percentage of
Metropolitan Area Total Operating Subsidy in Each Area
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Federal and state levels together ranges from 100% in Baltimore to 0% in
New Orleans, Houston, and Denver; other cities span the entire gamut of
intervening values. The relative importance of state and Federal aid,
individually, also is very different from one metropolitan area to another.
The Federal share of the total operating subsidy varies, moreover,
by size of metropolitan area. Federal aid covered only 19% of the
deficit in metropolitan areas with at least a million residents, but 35%
of the deficit in areas with populations from 500,000 to a million, and
40% in areas with fewer than 500,000 residents. 5 Thus, the smaller the
city, the more likely that the overall financing is progressive. Because
transit rider incomes are also lowest in small cities, the net benefit
distribution in such areas may be especially favorable for the poor.
Current Composition of Transit Financing by Type of Tax
The tax most frequently used for financing operating subsidies in
1975 was the general sales tax, accounting for roughly a third of total
funding (see Table 6.3). The property tax and individual income tax each
accounted for about a fifth of the total, and various business taxes,
excise taxes, and tolls covered most of the remainder. These figures
reflect funding patterns only in the 26 largest U.S. metropolitan areas;
but the national pattern undoubtedly was almost identical, for these 26
areas account for 85% of the nationwide operating subsidy.
Comparable decomposition by tax type can be roughly approximated
for capital subsidy financing. By statutory provision, 80% of capital
funds were supplied by the Federal government. As in the case of
operating funds, it can be assumed that the composition of supporting
taxes was the same as for general Federal revenues since no Federal taxes
Table 6.3 Sources of Transit Operating Subsidy Funds in the 26 Largest
U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 1975.6
Level of Government/Type of Tax* Amount (Thousands of Dollars)
Federal** $280,222
Individual Income Tax 156,924
Corporation Income Tax 78,462
Other 44,836
State 435,142
Excise taxes 75,423
Unidentified 62,647
Gasoline and Motor Vehicle Taxes 12,776
General Sales Taxes 209,018
Business Taxes 36,677
Individual Income Taxes 114,024
Local (including Regional) 848,151
Gasoline and Motor Vehicle Excise Taxes 30,349
General Sales Taxes 328,349
Business Taxes 45,322
Individual Income Taxes 29,136
Property Taxes 345,363
Payroll Taxes 14,799
Unidentified Non-Property Taxes 55,034
Bridge and Tunnel Tolls 105,853
Utility Cross-subsidies 10,858
Freight Cross-subsidies 11-,166
Total, All Sources $1,691,392
*Where taxes were not specifically earmarked for transit subsidization, the
operating subsidy in each metropolitan area was distributed according to the
composition of local general tax revenues in each specific area. The same
procedure was followed at the state level. (See Appendix to this chapter for
tables listing the composition of general revenues at the metropolitan and
state levels.) The state and local figures do not indicate any allowance for
the Federal contribution to general fund coffers via revenue-sharing grants.
These accounted for about 4% of state-local revenues in 1975. Ultimately,
therefore, Federal taxes accounted for an even higher proportion of total
operating subsidies than shown in the table, and state-local taxes a lower
percentage than indicated.
**
There are no taxes at the Federal level specifically earmarked for
transit. Therefore, amounts of specific taxes under this category reflect
the composition of general revenues only, texcluding payroll taxes for social
security.
This total excludes about $300 million in operating subsidies to
transit in smaller metropolitan areas.
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are specifically earmarked for transit use. Such earmarking for capital
transit purposes does occur to some extent at non-Federal levels, but
data were not available to establish the precise breakdown. Thus, in the
incidence analysis of the following chapter, it is assumed that the 20%
non-Federal share of capital funding was financed by the same tax composi-
tion as was non-Federal financing of operating subsidies.
Of the $3.62 billion government subsidy of transit operating and
capital expenditures combined in 1975, $1.19 billion (33%) was funded by
local or regional governments. By comparison, the Federal share was
$1.73 billion (49%) and the state share was $.70 billion (19%).* By
1976, the Federal share had increased to 53%, and the state and local
shares had decreased to 17% and 31%, respectively, reflecting the continu-
ing shift of transit finance responsibility to the Federal government.
*In making these summary calculations, it was assumed that half of
the $341 million non-Federal share of capital financing was attributable to
state government, and the otherhalf to local and regional governments. The
assumption is rough but reasonable and, at any rate, has very little effect
on the overall estimates.
CHAPTER 7: THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE TRANSIT TAX BURDEN
AMONG INCOME CLASSES
The distribution of the tax cost of transit subsidization depends
both on the degree of progressivity or regressivity of each of the taxes
assessed to support the subsidy program and on the relative importance of
each tax as a source of subsidy funds. On the basis of the percentage
composition of public transit funding by type of tax and level of govern-
ment, disaggregate estimates of various general tax distributions are
weighted and then aggregated to calculate the overall distribution of the
transit subsidy tax burden.
National Estimates of Tax Distribution
It is not a simple matter to estimate, even for general government
financing, the distribution of the burden of each particular type of tax
at each level of government. Indeed, numerous books have been devoted
entirely to establishing the distributional characteristics of one or
another specific taxes. Although public finance economists have been study-
ing tax incidence for many years, there is still much disagreement on the
true ultimate impacts and burden distributions of even the most widely used
taxes. Moreover, it turns out that the estimated distributions depend
crucially on the subjective tax shifting assumptions which underlie the
analysis; it is very difficult to test objectively the validity of these
assumptions.
An original, in-depth analysis of tax incidence is quite beyond the
scope of the present study. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify the
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most agreed-upon assumptions underlying the tax burden distributions and,
on the basis of these consensual assumptions, to calculate standard
estimtes for each tax type.
This is the approach adopted by Musgrave, Case, and Leonard in their
study of the nationwide distribution of fiscal burdens in 1968.1 First,
they examine the different assumptions which have been made with respect to
the incidence of various taxes and then either select those that have been
most widely adopted by the public finance profession or formulate compromise
assumptions on the basis of widely held but conflicting ones. Table 7.1
lists the consensual assumptions chosen for their quantitative analysis.
It is assumed, for example, that the personal income tax is ultimately borne
by the individual taxpayerbut that half of the corporation income tax is
shifted to consumers in the form of higher product prices and that the
remainder is borne by recipients of capital income. The sales tax is
assumed to fall ultimately on the consumer. And whereas the property tax
on single-family houses, by assumption, is borne by homeowners, all of the
property tax on rental housing is shifted from the landlord to the t enant.
On the basis of these assumptions, the total amount of each type of
tax is allocated among income classes according to the distribution of the
utlimate tax base for each tax. The individual income tax, for example, is
simply distributed according to the distribution of total tax payments by
each income class since it is assumed that no shifting occurs. Similarly,
the sales tax is distributed according to the percentage of total consump-
tion expenditures accounted for by each income class. The property tax
on rental housing, in contrast, is allocated according to the distribution
of rental payments; the property tax on businesses is allocated partly on
Table 7.1 Standard Incidence Assumptions Underlying the Tax Distribution
Estimates 2
Incidence Allocated
Tax Assumptions According to:
Individual income tax
Corporation income tax
Stays put
One-half on
consumption
One-half on
capital income
Tax payments
Consumption
Capital income
Excises and sales taxes
Estate and gift taxes
Property tax
Residences
Rental housing
Business
Payroll tax
Employer
Employee
Consumption
Donors
Homeowners
Tenants
One-half consumption
One-half capital
income
Consumers
Employees
Type of consumption
Capital income above
$25,000
Ownership
Rental payments
Consumption
Capital income
Consumption
Covered earnings
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the basis of the distribution of consumer expenditures and partly according
to the distribution of capital income.
The resulting distributions of absolute tax payments of each type
are then expressed as a percentage of the total income in each income
class. As indicated by the resulting estimates displayed in Table 7.2,
there is significant variation among tax types in the degree of progres-
sivity or regressivity.* The Federal individual income tax is estimated
to be very progressive, amounting to only 2% of the total income in the
under-$4,000 category but 19% in the $92,000-and-over category. The local
property tax is moderately regressive, with tax payments declining from 7%
of income in the poorest class to 3.3% in the most affluent. The general
sales tax, however, is estimated to be very regressive. The most affluent
class pays less than a tenth the percentage of its income in sales taxes
as does the poorest class (.3% as opposed to 3.4%). For the tax structure
as a whole, these distributive differences tend to offset each other so
that the overall distribution of the tax burden in the U.S. is roughly
proportional. At the lower end of the income spectrum, the distribution
is slightly progressive, but the total tax burden as a percentage of
income spans a narrow range, from 29% in the poorest category to 36% in
the most affluent.** Of course, the same distribution also indicates that
A progressive tax, by definition, is one whose burden, as a percent-
age of total income, is greater for affluent classes than for low-income
classes. Conversely, the burdens of a regressive tax represent higher
percentages of the incomes of the poor than they do of the affluent.
**As the authors demonstrate, the specific estimates vary considerably
with alterations in the incidence assumptions of Table 7.1.4 The initial
assumptions made seen quite reasonable, however, and it is unlikely that the
actual distributions are very different from the estimates displayed here.
At any rate, the estimates of Table 7.2 were the only comprehensive ones
available.
Table 7.2 The Distribution of General Tax Burdens by Income Brackets, 19683
(Taxes as Percentages of Total Income in Each Category)
Income Brackets
Taxes Under $4K $5.7K $7.9K $10.4K $12,5K $17.5K $22,6K $35,5K $92K AllTe Uto to to to to to to to and Brackets
$4K $5.7K $7.9K $10.4K $12.5K $17.5K $22.6K $35.5K $92K Over
Federal Taxe
1)Individual
, income tax
2)Estate and
gift tax
3)Corporation
income tax
4)Excises and
customs
5)Payroll tax
6)Total
7)Total excluding
line 5
2,0 2.8 5.9 7,1 7.9 10,1 10.6 12.7 14,8 18,5
0,6
5.1
2,5
5.5
15.2
6,1
2,8
6,3
17,9
5.0
3.1
7.0
20.8
4.0
3..0
6.9
21.6
4.3
2.9
6,7
21.6
4,6
2,7
6.1
23.4
4,8
2,1
5,2
22.6
5,1
1,1
4.2
23,8
2,0
5.3
0,9
1,5
24,5
2,7
6.6
0,6
0,6
29,1
9,9
0,4
5.0
2,3
2,2
22,7
002
9,7 11,6 13.9 14.7 14,9 17,3 17,4 19,6 23.0 28,5 17,5
State and Local Taxes
8)Individual
income tax
9)Inheritance tax
10)Corporation
income tax
1l)General sales
tax
12)Excises
13)Property tax
14)Payroll tax
15)Total
16)Total excluding
line 14
All Levels
T7)Total
18)Total excluding
lines 5 and 14
- 0.1
0.4
3.4
2.7
6.7
0.2
13.4
0.5
2.8
3.0
5.7
0.5
12.1
13.2 12.1
0,3
0.4
2.5
3.3
4.7
0.B
11.9
11.1
0,6
0.4
2,3
3.0
4.3
1.0
1 .6
0.7
.
0.3
2,2
2.9
4.0
1.0
11.1
10.6 10.1
1.1
0.4
2.0
2,5
3.7
1.0
10.6
9.6
1.4
0.4
1.7
1,9
3.3
1.1
9.7
8.6
2,3
0.2
0.4
1.0
1.0
3.0
1.2
9.1
7.9
1,6
0.6
0.4
0.5
0.8
2.9
0.2
7.1
6.9
1,3
0,8
0.5
0.3
0.6
3,3
0.1
6.9
6,8
1.0
0,1
0.4
1.8
2.1
3.9
0.8
9.5
9.5
28,5 30.5 32.8 33.1 32.8 33.9 32.4 32.9 31.6 35.9 33,0
23.7 25.0 25.3 25.0 26.9 26,0 27.5 29.9 35,3 27,022.9
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affluent individuals pay much larger absolute tax bills than do low-income
persons.
The Distribution of the Burden of Transit Taxation
The distribution of the burden of transit taxation could conceivably
be very different from the overall distribution of the burden of taxation
for all purposes. Were it dominated by the sales tax, for example, it
would be much more regressive, whereas if dominated by the income tax, it
would be more progressive. Adjusting the general tax distributions to
conform with the different composition of transit revenues, the following
analysis calculates tax distributions specific to transit operating
subsidies and subsequently, capital subsidies. These two distributions
are then simply added to calculate the overall distribution of the transit
tax burden.
Estimating the modified tax distributions for operating subsidies
involved three steps. First, each of the general distributions was normal-
ized so that distributions for different taxes would be comparable., In
Table 7.2, the percentages in line 1, for example, are much higher than
those in line 4 simply because total Federal income tax proceeds were more
than 4 times as great as Federal excise taxes and customs fees. Each line
of this table, therefore, was proportionally adjusted to reflect the burden
distribution of $1 of tax revenue from each tax.
Next, each tax's distribution was weighted by the percentage of the
total transit subsidy financed by that specific tax at each level of
government. Thus, the sales tax, for example, was given 40 times as much
weight in the aggregate distribution as was the state and local payroll
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tax.
Finally, all percentages in the table were adjusted proportionally
so that,in aggregate, the distributions would reflect the percentage of
total U.S. personal income in 1975 devoted to transit subsidization (.298%).
The distributions of the various types of taxes at each level of government
were added to obtain the estimates of the distribution of the operating
subsidy tax burden displayed in Table 7.3.* Although the Federally-funded
portion is moderately progressive, it is overwhelmed by the much larger
state and local portion, which is significantly regressive. The distribu-
tion for all government levels, therefore, is moderately regressive.
Whereas households with incomes less than $4,000 pay taxes equal to .209%
of their incomes to support transit operations, households earning more
than $35,500 pay only about half this percentage (.116%).
The distribution of taxation to fund capital subsidies was estimated
in roughly the same manner, but not in tax-by-tax detail because data were
not available on the specific taxes used to finance capital subsidies at
the state and local level. It was assumed, therefore, that the 20%, state-
local portion of capital funding was financed by the same composition of
taxes as was used at this level for operating subsidies. Thus, although
the absolute percentages differ, the percentage distribution of the state-
local tax burden among income classes is assumed to be the same for both
types of subsidies.
*Because the 1968 Musgrave estimates were the most recent available,
it was necessary to assume that the tax structure remained roughly constant
from 1968 to 1975. Although rates of taxation have increased somewhat,
the overall tax structure at each government level has not changed signi-
ficantly.
Table 7.3 The Distribution of Transit Capital and Operating Subsidy Tax Burdens by Level of Government
(Taxes as Percentages of Total Personal Income in Each Income Category), 19755
Income Class*
Level of Under $4K $5.7K $7.9K $10.4K $12.5K $17.5K $22.6K $35.5K Over All
Government $4K to to to to to to to to $92K Incomes
$5.7K $7.9K $10.4K $12.5K $17.5K $22.6K $35.5K $92K
Operating Subsidies
Federal .015 .018 .022 .023 .024 .028 .028 .031 .037 .045 .028
State and Local .194 .176 .162 .154 .147 .141 .127 .106 .078 .072 .132
Total, All Levels .209 .194 .184 .177 .171 .169 .155 .137 .115 .117 .160
Capital Subsidies
Federal .058 .070 .084 .088 .090 .104 .104 .118 .138 .172 .105
State and Local ,049 .042 .041 .039 .037 .036 .032 .027 .019 .018 .033
Total, All Levels .107 .112 .125 .127 .127 .140 .136 .145 .157 .190 .138
Transit Subsidies, Total**
Federal .073 .088 .106 .111 .114 .132 .132 .149 .175 .217 .133
State and Local .243 .218 .203 .193 .184 .177 .159 .133 .097 .090 .165
Total, All Levels .316 .306 .309 .304 .298 .309 .291 .282 .272 .307 .298
*The ujnusual income cateoitonIidtca to that used in the study from which the general tax
distribution estimates of Table 7.2 are derived. It was used in that study for computational convenience.
Due to the unavailability of more recent estimates, we have necessarily been forced to assume that the
relative distribution of the tax burden did not change significantly from 1968 to 1975.
**These incidence estimates do not -incorporate the impact of Federal general revenue-sharing grants to
state and local government, which accounted for almost four percent of state and local revenues in 1975. If
these inter-governmental transfers are included in the incidence calculations, the resulting distribution of
the total transit subsidy tax burden is less regressive.
Federal
State and Local
Total, All Levels
.077
.233
.310
.092
.209
.301
.111
.195
.306
,117
.185
.302
.120
.177
.297
.139
.170
.309
.139
.153
.292
.156
,128
.284
.184
.093
,277
.228
.086
,314
.140
.158
.298
0,
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Similarly, although for different reasons,* the Federal tax burden
arising from the funding of capital subsidies is the same as for operating
subsidies, although, as at the state-local level, the absolute percentages
vary due to the difference between absolute amounts of capital funding and
operating funding.
As shown in Table 7.3, capital subsidy financing, overall, is moder-
ately progressive, with households earning $92,000 or more contributing
almost twice as high a percentage of their incomes for capital subsidiza-
tion as did households earning less than $4,000. This result follows, of
course, from the dominance of progressive Federal taxation in the funding
of capital subsidies.
When aggregated for both types of subsidies, the Federal portion
obviously retains the same degree of progressivity as the Federal distri-
butions for each subsidy type. The same holds for the state-local portion.
In the aggregation over government levels, however, the Federal progres-
sivity dominant in the capital subsidy financing just offsets the state-
local regressivity dominant in the operating subsidy financing so that
the overall financing of transit subsidization is roughly proportional.
When adjusted to account for Federal general revenue-sharing grants to
state and local government, the overall distribution is only.slightly regres-
sive over most of its range and actually becomes slightly progressive
at the very highest income levels. Nevertheless, at least at this
national level of aggregation, transit financing does appear to be somewhat
*Namely, that the Federal level is not disaggregated by type of
tax for either operating or capital subsidies because no Federal taxes
are earmarked for transit use.
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more regressive than the financing of government expenditures in general.*
Variations Among Metropolitan Areas
The distribution of the transit tax burden obviously is not the same
for every metropolitan area. As documented in Chapter 6, there are signi-
ficant differences among areas in the percentage composition of transit
funding by level of government. Financing in smaller metropolitan
areas, for example, almost certainly is more progressive than in large
areas because the Federal share of operating subsidies is about twice as
high in areas with fewer than a million residents than it is in larger
cities. Moreover, since state governments rely primarily on the sales
tax and personal income tax whereas local governments depend mainly on
the property tax, the varying composition of non-Federal support by
level of government probably has considerable distributional consequences.
There are also substantial differences in the specific tax mechanisms
employed at the state and local levels, the jurisdictional coverage of
local transit taxes, and the inclusiveness of the bases of state and
local taxes. Portland, for example, derives almost all of its non-rederal
* The aggregate distributional estimates presented here do not account
for the pronounced geographic clustering of state and local transit financ-
ing in the dense, transit-oriented cities and heavily-urbanized states of
the Northeast and Great Lakes, or more generally, in the 25 or so largest
American metropolitan areas. The aggregate distributions assume that the
state-local tax burden is spread evenly over the United States and do not
control for the relatively insignificant contributions from rural or low-
density urban areas to support transit. Because incomes, on average, are
considerably higher in urban areas than rural areas, and because state
and especially local transit taxation is concentrated in these high-income
areas, theanational estimates probably overstate the regressivity of state
and local taxation. Unfortunately, it was not possible to adjust the
national estimates to reflect the geographic clustering.
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subsidy funds from a regionwide employer payroll tax, whereas Miami raises
its corresponding non-Federal share via a county-wide gasoline tax, and
Cincinnati raises its share from an earnings tax. Boston and Milwaukee,
in contrast, rely entirely on the property tax for localfunds, although
there are supplemented by state subsidies roughly equal in magnitude.
Most major cities have regional mechanisms of some sort to extract contribu-
tions from the suburbs; but in a few areas, the suburbs escape this burden,
and the local financing of transit in such areas tends to be more regres-
sive as a result. Finally, the inclusiveness of each tax base, which also
varies from one area to another, can affect the incidence of any given
tax. When food and clothing are exempted, for example, the sales tax
becomes much less regressive. Because non-Federal funding can vary signi-
ficantly in each of these dimensions, the overall regressivity of non-
Federal transit financing may vary considerably from one metropolitan
area to another. 6
Improving the Distribution of Transit Financing
The present chapter has estimated the distribution of the tax burden
of transit subsidization on the basis of the current composition of transit
financing by level of government and type of tax. This composition, of
course, is hardly inutable; rather, it is the outcome of deliberate
public policy and can certainly be expected to change over time. Indeed,
the trends toward increased Federal subsidization noted in Chapter 6
suggest that the regressivity of transit financing has been steadily
diminishing and will probably continue to diminish at least in the near
future.
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Many state and local officials undoubtedly would prefer the Federal
government to foot the entire bill for transit subsidization. Such ex-
clusively Federal financing might enhance progressivity, but it almost
certainly would introduce strong incentives for inefficiency in the use
of public resources. Local government officials would have virtually no
incentives for cost control, and transit authorities would feel little
pressure to increase productivity or curb wage inflation. Moreover, such
Federal subsidization would further weaken the link between the benefits
and costs of transit. At least currently, expansion of transit service
requires local public officials to balance somewhat the anticipated bene-
fits with probable tax costs. With 100% Federal funding, no tax costs
would be perceived by local officials, and overexpansion would probably
result. Indeed, such an impact is already evident with 80% Federal funding
of capital subsidies and 10%-50% Federal funding of operating subsidies.
Thus, while the transit financing structure is not inmutable,
neither can it be changed at will simply to achieve one out of the many
objectives of transit subsidization. To some extent, the tax structure
at any time represents a compromise among these many goals.
PART III: SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This final part of the study draws together and compares the
benefit and cost: analyses of Parts I and II. On the basis of net benefit
calculations at selected income levels, conclusions are drawn with respect
to the overall distributional impact of transit subsidization. Policy
implications of these are discussed, and suggestions are made for improv-
ing the effectiveness of the transit program in achieving equity objectives.
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CHAPTER 8: THE NET DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF THE
TRANSIT SUBSIDY PROGRAM
The benefits analysis of Part I suggests that most of the $4 billion
nationwide transit subsidy is devoted to transit services used primarily
by riders with incomes between $4,500 and $15,000. This income group is
estimated to receive 56% of the total subsidy, although it accounts for
only 41% of all households. In contrast, the poorest class, which
includes 17% of all households, receives at most only 9% of the total
subsidy* (see Table 5.1). Thus, although the transit program is often
touted as being particularly beneficial to the poor, the program, in
fact, is designed so that an almost negligible percentage of subsidy funds
is devoted to improving the transportation of low-income travelers. Tran-
sit subsidies, as they are currently used, may be justified on other grounds,
but they appear to be very inefficient means of relieving poverty.
Nevertheless, the poor do not contribute much in taxes supporting
the transit subsidies, so that whereas the program undoubtedly is npt
strongly progressive, neither is the distributional impact of transit
subsidization severely regressive. As estimated in Part II, the tax
structure of public transit financing is roughly proportional (see Table
7.3). The poorest income class pays only a slightly higher percentage
of its total income for transit taxation (.310% as opposed to .298%
for all income classes) and, of course, contributes much smaller absolute
This figure represents an upper bound because it does not take
into account intramodal cross-subsidization of affluent riders at the
expense of poor riders.
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amounts. A household earning $20,000, for example, is assessed more than
6 times as much in transit taxes as a $3,000 household although it
receives only 1.5 times as much of the transit subsidy as the poor household.
Sample Calculations of Net Benefit
Table 8.1 presents a number of sample net subsidy calculations for
households at selected income levels. These estimates indicate that,
although the poor receive less than their share of transit subsidies,
they pay so few taxes that their net benefits are positive. For example,
a household with an income of $3,000 receives, on avarege, $33 more in
subsidies than it pays in transit taxes. The largest net gains, however,
accrue to households earning $7,000 and $12,000; they receive at least
$77 more, on average, than they pay to finance subsidization. The big
losers, on net, are households in the most affluent categories. Transit
taxes of households earning $50,000 and $100,000 exceed their transit
subsidies by $74 and $249, respectively. Middle-income groups just about
break even.
These results should not be construed as justification for overall
expansion of the transit program on equity grounds. Most other government
programs are also financed by taxation that is roughly proportional and
thus requires minimal absolute tax payments by the poor. Thejnet absolute
benefits to the poor of many other programs--even those not intended to
relieve poverty--are thus also positive although only a small percentage
of the total benefits accrues to the poor. Nevertheless, the sample
calculations of Table 8.1 do suggest that, however inefficient transit
subsidization is relative to other explicitly redistributive programs, it
Table 8.1. Sample Calculations of Per Household Transit Sfbsidies, Net
of Tax Costs, for Selected Income Levels, 1975
Household Transit Subsidy Transit Tax Net Transit Subsidy
Income Per Household Per Household Per Household
$ 3,000 $42 $ 9 + $33
$.7,000 99 21 + 78
$12,000 113 36 + 77
$18,000 63 52 + 11
$25,000 65 71 - 6
$50,000 65 139 - 74
$100,000 65 314 - 249
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definitely does not aggravate income inequality.
General Conditions for Progressivity
It is noteworthy that the calculated net subsidy to the poor would
have exceeded that to the most affluent even if the tax financing had been
significantly regressive and the transit subsidies accruing to high-income
groups had been even larger relative to those accruing to the poor than was
estimated for 1975. Suppose, for example, that the effective transit tax
rate had been twice as high for households with incomes less than $4,000
as, in fact, it was (.620% vs. .310%) and that the rate for households
with incomes exceeding $92,000 had been half what it was (.157% vs. .314%).
Assume, further, that subsidies to households earning more than $22,500 had
been twice as large as they actually were. The net transit subsidy to
the $3,000 household would still have exceeded that of the $100,000 house-
hold (+ $23 vs. - $27) although the difference obviously would not have
been as great as it was in fact (+ $33 vs. $-249).
With even greater regressivity,this result could, of course, be
reversed. Moreover, if the same comparison is made between less extreme
income groups, the less affluent group in some cases receives less absolute
net subsidy. In general, though, the absolute net subsidy will decrease
as income levels rise unless the tax system is so regressive that absolute
tax payments increase more slowly as incomes increase than do absolute
subsidy levels. Given the moderate differences among income groups in
per-household transit subsidies, the tax structure would have to be extra-
ordinarily regressive for transit subsidies net of tax costs to increase
monotonically over most of the income distribution.
Of course, the welfare of low-income groups would be most aided by
a combination of progressive taxation and a benefit distribution character-
ized by per-household subsidies declining with increasing income. As argued
above, however, the distribution of income, under certain conditions, may
be made more equal even by programs that are regressively financed and
for which per capita benefits are greatest for the affluent.*
Indeed, when one compares the overall degree of progressivity of the
current public financing of transit operating deficits and capital invest-
ments with the alternative, "free-market" type of financing via fare
increases and service cuts, it is likely that the present method of
financing--though far from ideal--is considerably less regressive. The
negligible tax savings that would accrue to the poor as a result of
subsidy cutbacks almost certainly would be offset by the deterioration in
the quality of transit service and the substantial increase in transporta-
tion costs.** In spite of below-average transit subsidies for the poor,
low-income households are better off than they wouldbetwithout a transit
program at all.
Technically, for the size distribution of income to be made more
equal, it is only necessary that positive net benefits--as a percentage of
income--decrease with higher income levels (or that negative net benefits
increase). Thus, even if the absolute net benefits of a program are
greater for affluent households, it is conceivable that the size distribution
of income nevertheless is equalized, provided that absolute net benefits
increase less rapidly than total income. (If absolute net benefits are
negative, however, these must increase more rapidly than income for equaliza-
tion of the distribution.) At any rate, wnen net benefits are positive for
low-income groups and negative for high-income groups, the size distribution
of income unequivocally is made more equal.
Transportation costs of the poor would increase both directly, as a
result of increased fares, and indirectly, as the result of the elimination
of certain routes or types of transit service, which would force some low-
income travelers to resort to much more expensive taxi service or auto owner-
ship. Almost all affluent households already own at least one car; this
second, indirect cost of transit service cutbacks, therefore, would probably
be much less significant for them.
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Comparative Progressivity
Moreover, the distributional impacts of transit subsidies should be
evaluated relative to the redistributive efficiency of alternative uses of
those funds. But what is the appropriate comparison? Relative to an ideal
negative income tax, virtually any other government program is likely to
appear unsatisfactory. Pure income transfers may represent the best alterna-
tive redistributive use of the funds, but they certainly are not the most
likely alternative use.* Rather, public resources withheld from transit
might have been used for urban highway construction.
As shown in Table 2.1, the income profile of urban auto users is
considerably higher than that of transit riders in aggregate. Moreover,
low-income auto users travel snorter distances than affluent users,2 they
make a higher percentage of their trips during off-peak hours 3 ; and they
travel at considerably higher vehicle.occupancies.4 Low-income groups,
therefore, impose disproportionately low costs on the urban highway network
and reap substantially less direct benefit from it than do more affluent
groups. Becaiuse low-income neighborhoods have been, by far, the mdst
popular routes for expressways, low-income individuals may also be impacted
more severely than other groups by the social and economic disruption of
highway construction as well as by the air pollution, noise, safety hazards,
and other externalities of auto use. Thus, relative to highway expenditures,
transit subsidies compare favorably in terms of redistributive impact.
*Similarly, government housing programs, education programs, and con-
ventional welfare programs are probably more cost-effective in their re-
distributive impact than are transit subsidies. It is not at all clear,
however, that withdrawn transit funds would be channeled into these types
of programs.
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Variations in Redistributive Impact
The net distributional impact of transit subsidization varies, of
course, from one metropolitan area to another. Indeed, there are consid-
erable differences both in the overall magnitude of the transit subsidy
and in the incidence pattern among income groups.
The differences in overall magnitude are, perhaps, most striking.
In the Boston metropolitan area, for example, the average operating subsidy
per 4-person household in 1975 was $208, whereas it was only $16 in Houston
and undoubtedly was even less in smaller, lower-density areas.5 Moreover,
capital subsidies are even more concentrated in the largest urban areas
than are operating subsidies. The 26 largest U.S. metropolitan areas
accounted for 85% of the national transit operating subsidy in 1975;6
84% of the total cumulative capital subsidy up to 1976 was spent in only
8 urban areas.7  For practical purposes, therefore, transit subsidies
have negligible overall benefit impact except in large, dense cities.
The incidence pattern of transit subsidies among income classes
also varies significantly from one type of metropolitan area to another.
As documented in Chapter 6, there are considerable differences among
cities in the mix of local, regional, state, and Federal funding to support
transit. And non-Federal funding varies with respect to the specific
types of tax mechanisms used and the extent of their jurisdictional
coverage. These differences in funding arrangements, which affect the
incidence of subsidy costs, are paralleled by differences that influence
the distribution of subsidy benefits. Metropolitan areas differ signifi-
cantly from one another in the income characteristics of transit riders,
the geographic extent and range of transit services, the cost of each
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type of service, and the spatial distributions of workplaces and residences
of the various income groups.
Most of this variation cannot be conveniently generalized. Neverthe-
less, transit financing tends to be most progressive in small metropolitan
areas although the total transit subsidy in such areas is usually negli-
gible. Rider incomes also tend to be significantly lower in smaller cities,
but such a small percentage of the poor use transit in such areas that the
resulting impact on the mobility of low-income travelers is virtually imper-
ceptible. In contrast, the highest rider incomes are in large, dense
metropolitan areas with rail rapid transit. Transit financing in these
areas is probably more regressive (due to the lower percentage of Federal
funding), and a higher proportion of the total transit subsidy accrues
to affluent riders. Nevertheless, a much higher percentage of the poor
use transit in such areas, and the elimination of transit service would
cause much more severe hardships for big-city poor than it would for
small-town poor. Thus, it is likely that the absolute level of redis-
tribution from high-income to low-income groups is much greater in large,
transit-oriented cities than in smaller cities, in spite of the lower
rider incomes and more progressive financing pattern in the smaller areas.
Finally, it should be obvious from the analysis of the foregoing
chapters that the distributional impact varies substantially from one
portion of the transit subsidy program to another. The commuter rail
program, for example, almost exclusively benefits high-income riders,
whereas the bus subsidy program primarily benefits low-income riders.
Although the capital subsidy program is much more progressively financed
than the operating subsidy, a higher percentage of the capital subsidy is
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devoted to transit services used by riders with incomes exceeding $15,000
(42% vs. 30%). Moreover, there is variation within each of these broad
categories. Short-haul inner-city bus service, for example, is used pri-
marily by low-income riders, whereas long-haul radial bus service from the
suburbs to downtown is patronized mostly by affluent commuters.
In evaluating the distributional impact of the transit subsidy pro-
gram, therefore, it is important to keep in mind that, regardless of the
overall impact, portions of the program are certainly progressive, and
modifications in its composition could render the program as a whole much
more progressive.
CHAPTER 9: POLICY IMPLICATIONS
It has been estimated that the transit subsidy program as a whole
has indeed redistributed income from high-income classes to low-income
classes. Although the poor have received less than their per-household
share of the total transit subsidy, they nevertheless have been more subsid-
ized than they have been taxed. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 1, the
distribution of true benefits (utility impacts) has been substantially more
favorable to low-income households than is suggested by the distribution
of subsidy expenditures.
The current transit subsidy program, therefore, does not exacerbate
inequality in the distribution of income; but neither does it redistribute
income very efficiently in comparison with other types of government
programs designed explicitly to aid the poor. This relative inefficiency
in redistribution arises from the very nature of transit services. Less
than a fifth of the nation's urban poor use any form of conventional transit,
and the vast majority of transit riders are not poor. Thus, transi't sub-
sidization provides virtually no benefits to 80% of the poor, and most of
the transit subsidy (91%) is spent to serve the non-poor. In contrast,
general income assistance programs reach a much higher percentage of the
poor and can altogether exclude the affluent. Even welfare assistance
in-kind, such as the provision of housing, medical care, and food, is
more efficient in this respect. The current transit subsidy program,
therefore, is not justifiable solely, or even primarily, on the basis
of its benefits to the poor.
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Increasing the Progressity of Transit Subsidization
In theory, of course, the subsidy program could be modified to
improve its redistributive efficiency. Discount transit passes for the
poor and improved service in low-income neighborhoods, for example, would
increase benefits to the poor. Sharp reductions in general subsidies to
commuter rail and rail rapid transit services would diminish the benefits
to affluent riders. Moreover, peak-load pricing and surcharges for longer
trips would eliminate much of the adverse intramodal cross-subsidization
of affluent riders by low-income riders and would increase the efficiency
of transit use as well. Congestion of transit vehicles and rights-of-way
during rush-hours would be reduced, and off-peak capacity would be less
under-utilized.
To some extent, however, the goal of increased equity may be incon-
sistent with other objectives of the transit program. The degree of
energy conservation, road congestion reduction, downtown revitalization,
and pollution reduction achieved by transit depends primarily on the number
of riders (especially former auto drivers) it can attract. Revisions in the
program that increase fares or decrease service levels for non-poor riders
might significantly discourage their patronage. The elasticity of demand
for transit use almost certainly increases with income due to higher rates
of auto ownership.* Thus, fare decreases and service improvements for the
poor would probably attract far fewer passengers than corresponding fare
*Quantitative estimates of fare elasticity differences among income
groups are not available. Economic theory suggests, however, that degree
of elasticity is significantly influenced by the extent to which substitutes
are available. In the case of transit use, therefore, elasticity would
be determined primarily by the level of auto ownership.
1 C5
increases and service cutbacks would discourage among the non-poor. More-
over, patronage declines on rapid transit and commuter rail lines would be
particularly detrimental. Because economies of scale are much more pro-
nounced for these rail modes than for bus transit, passenger losses would
entail considerably larger increases in cost per passenger served.
Indeed, given the goal of ridership maximization, the current pattern
of subsidization is hardly accidental. On the contrary, it has arisen as
the logical response to differential demand elasticity among income groups
and modal variation in economies of scale. Whereas poor riders are gener-
ally considered by transit operators a captive market to be taken
for granted, significant efforts have been made to attract the affluent,
and these efforts have entailed large subsidy expenditures.* Poor riders
have suffered the additional misfortune of patronizing a type of transit
that is characterized by roughly constant returns to scale and for which
operating subsidies are thus less warranted on efficiency grounds.
It probably would not be advisable to eliminate all subsidies to
non-poor riders in an attempt to improve the redistributive effectiveness
of the transit program. Nevertheless, subsidies to affluent riders might
be reduced somewhat by raising fares for rush-hour service in dense corridors
(for which demand is very inelastic) or by curtailing services that produce
few social benefits. Such cutbacks would reduce the total transit
*BART in San Francisco and Metrorail in Washington, for example, have
been designed primarily to attract suburban riders. On a smaller scale,
express bus routes to the suburbs have been set up in most large metro-
politan areas, and parking at suburban stops is sometimes provided to
connuters free of charge or at artifically low rates as extra inducement not
to drive. Finally, most improvements in transit vehicle quality have been
intended to increase transit use among middle-income groups. Low-income
riders are not nearly as sensitive to amenities such as air conditioning,
carpeting, padded seats, and modern design.
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subsidy without significantly disrupting the urban transportation system
or the urban economy.
Conversely, benefits to the economically disadvantaged could be
increased with moderate additional funding by improving bus service in
low-income neighborhoods and by providing discount passes to the poor for
use on all transit modes. Of course, even this approach is likely to
enhance the mobility of only those poor clustered in relatively high-
density neighborhoods. For the majority of the poor, who live in small
or low-density urban areas (or low-density portions of urban areas), some-
thing much closer to auto-type service appears to be appropriate. Indeed,
in spite of the considerable financial burden of auto ownership and opera-
tion, 44% of all urban travelers with incomes less than $3,000 in 1970
were auto drivers, and 39% were auto passengers. The significant public
policy issue with respect to these low-income auto users is to what extent
they should be relieved of high automobile costs. Although a widespread
program of subsidizing auto use among low-income households would undoubtedly
be effective in enhancing their mobility, it would probably entail ,very
high public costs and arouse considerable political opposition from tax-
payers who might resent the prospect of supporting relatively expensive,
high-quality transportation for the poor.
Even as the potential for increasing the proportion of transit sub-
sidy expenditures accruing to the poor is limited, so is the potential
for increasing the progressivity of transit financing. 100% Federal
financing would indeed be more progressive than the current mix, but would
introduce strong incentives for inefficiency and overexpansion. Similarly,
it is not likely that relatively affluent suburbanites would be willing
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to increase their contributions for regional support of transit without
corresonding increases in transit service to the suburbs in return. In-
creased state subsidies for transit are regularly opposed by rural and
small-town residents, and sometimes by suburbanites as well, unless such
state financing will significantly reduce their local tax contributions.
Similar to Federal funding, moreover, state financing also introduces
incentives .for cost inflation, although to a lesser extent, because tax-
payers in any given urban area bear a larger proportion of the total state
budget than of the total Federal budget.
Prospects for Transit Funding
Although the growth in government subsidization of transit was very
rapid from 1970 to 1975, recent growth has been much slower, and it is
conceivable that even the absolute level of subsidization will decrease
in coming years. Compared to an annual, inflation-adjusted rate of increase
of 38% between 1970 and 1975, transit subsidies grew by only 4% between
1975 and 1976, and preliminary reports indicate that growth was even slower
between 1976 and 1977.2 Moreover, the transit program has been increasingly
attacked at all levels of government for its burgeoning public costs.
Indeed, in a recent nationwide address, President Carter cited urban mass
transit as one of five programs most responsible for the overall inflation-
ary growth of government expenditures. Pressures for increased Federal
transit subsidies, he indicated, would be vigorously resisted.3 At the
state level, the Pennsylvania legislature has enacted a law requiring
that farebox revenues cover at least 40% of transit operating costs,
and several states are considering implementing similar restrictions. 4
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(Of the 26 largest metropolitan areas in the United States, 9 would
have violated this standard in 1976.)5
The growing aversion to transit subsidization has developed partly
in response to general economic trends beyond the control of transit
operators. Stagnation of the American economy has sharply slowed down
the growth in personal income per capita. Increases in taxation have
been vigorously opposed because such increases represent a greater burden
to taxpayers than previously. This growing fiscal austerity has been evi-
dent at virtually all government levels, but particularly at the local level
in dense, old cities, where most transit service is concentrated and where
the burden of transit subsidization, therefore,has been greatest. Tax
bases in these cities have been declining, while welfare costs and public
service expenditures have continued to grow.
To a significant extent, however, the fading popularity of transit
subsidization is a consequence of the striking failure of transit to ful-
fill expectations. The transit program has increasingly come to be per-
ceived by academics as well as policymakers and voters as producing dis-
appointingly little in the way of either rider benefits or social benefits.
Instead, much of the transit subsidy is viewed as having been consumed by
rapid increases in the wages of transit employees, by productivity losses,
by goldplating in the construction of new transit vehicles and rail rapid
transit systems, and by Federal regulations that have inflated capital
costs by requiring high minimum wages for transit construction workers,
accessibility of systems to even the most severely handicapped, and
purchase from American suppliers even when they are not the lowest bidders.
Whereas subsidies were once thought to be the solution to transit's fiscal
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crisis, they have increasingly come to be viewed as part of the problem,
and there is considerable pressure both to reduce the level of subsidization
as well as to revise its character so as to minimize incentives for ineffi-
ciency.
Alternative Futures for Transit Subsidization
Depending on the nature of subsidy curtailment and the specific opera-
tional responses to cutbacks, the overall distributional effect of the
transit program may be significantly altered. The shift in equity impact
would be substantial if the allocation of the total subsidy among modes
were very much changed. Moreover, variation of intramodal subsidy alloca-
tions would also produce some degree of benefit shift.
The extent and character of capital funding modificiations will be
determined primarily at the Federal level, which currently finances 80%
of capital invetment costs. Changes in the level of operating subsidiza-
tion, although also influenced by Federal guidelines and matching funds,
will be formulated mainly at state and local levels. The specific, fare
and service impacts of operating subsidy changes will, in turn, depend
on the decisions of local transit operators and thus may vary considerably
from one metropolitan area to another.
Capital Subsidies
Even a substantial cutback in capital subsidization would probably
have negligible impact on transit operations. Given the nature of current
criticism, it is likely that such a cutback would primarily involve a
Federally-imposed moratorium on the construction of expensive new rail
rapid transit systems. Most studies suggest that these, at any rate,
would attract few additional passengers and would produce negligible
social benefits.6 Necessary transit vehicle replacement and right-of-way
maintenance almost certainly could be financed at less than half of the
$2 billion cost of the current program. Since most of the benefits of
new rail rapid transit service accrue to affluent users, the distribution
of the reduced capital subsidy would be considerably more progressive
than the present distribution.
Operating Subsidies
A far more difficult problem is posed by threatened reductions in oper-
ating subsidies. Unlike capital investment, operating expenses cannot
easily be postponed or eliminated. Fare hikes, servi'ce cutbacks, pro-
ductivity gains, and labor cost controls--the four major options available
for reducing the operating deficit--entail significant losses to influen-
tial groups. Transit riders, therefore, oppose fare increases and
service degradation while transit employees fight wage freezes and, work
rule changesthat would eliminate jobs or require extra work per employee.
However unpopular these austerity measures, transit agencies nevertheless
will be forced to implement at least some of them in the event that oper-
ating subsidies are, in fact, cut. In choosing among them, transit
officials should consider not only the impacts on ridership, revenues,
and costs but also the distributional consequences of each measure.
Reducing operating costs. Transit operating expenses can be lowered
either by cutting back service or by increasing the productivity of
transit operations. Transit service is, in general, most unprofitable
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during evenings and weekends, when passenger volumes are lowest. Not
only are vehicle occupancies low at these times, but the labor cost per
vehicle mile is higher due to overtime wage rates and the hiring of
additional full-time shifts that are used only part-time. Many non-
radial, crosstown bus services have very low occupancy rates as well.
Although eliminating these low-volume services would considerably reduce
transit operating costs, doing so might be particularly immobilizing for
the poor, who depend on such services more than do affluent riders.
Curtailment of commuter rail services, in contrast, would increase the
progressivity of the distribution of subsidy benefits; patrons of these
services have the highest average income of any modal user group. Except
in New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia, commuter rail carries less than
5% of transit users, produces negligible social benefits, requires
extremely high operating deficits per passenger, and could easily be
replaced by low-cost express bus service. 8 Even some routes in New York,
Chicago, and Philadelphia could be eliminated with minimal adverse
impact.
Most of the potential for cost reduction, however, lies in cutting
overall labor costs, which account for roughly 80% of total operating
expense. Labor productivity could be increased by changing work rules to
permit split work shifts, use of part-time vehicle operators during rush
hours, and use of full-time employees for non-driving tasks during off-
peak hours. 9 These measures would minimize the underutilization of
transit vehicle operators during off-peak hours and thus would signifi-
cantly increase the average number of vehicle miles of service produced
per employee.* Productivity would also be enhanced by the retraction, in
*
Provided, of course, that transit systems are permitted to dismiss
employees who are no longer needed as a result of the productivity gains.
112
a few cities, of union contract clauses that require the deliberate over-
manning of transit vehicles. Finally, the establishment and enforcement
of strict standards for employee performance, though certain to be
unpopular with employees, would increase productivity of workers to
whatever extent they currently loaf on the job or perform incompetently.
Resistance of transit employees to productivity drives such as those
just described would be exceeded only by their opposition to cuts in
their wages and fringe benefits, the most obvious means to reduce transit
labor costs. It is unlikely that transit workers could be convinced to
accept all these changes; on the contrary, they would probably stage
disruptive strikes. A less dramatic, though more feasible, approach
would be pegging the rate of real wage increases to the rate of produc-
tivity gain. This tactic, which has been adopted in New York, appears
to have been somewhat successful. Labor costs have not actually been
reduced there, but growth in these costs has been much slower than in
previous years. To whatever extent labor productivity and wage restraint
measures can be implemented, the distributional impact will be a reduction
in operating subsidy benefits to the lower middle class and an increase in
benefits to classes with lower or higher incomes.
Increasing operating revenues. Transit operating deficits could
also be reduced by increasing fares or attracting additional passengers
without providing commensurate increases in service. In general, the
more inelastic the demand for a commodity, the greater the percentage
increase in revenues resulting from a price increase. Since the fare
elasticity of demand for transit use is quite low for most types of
transit service, the revenue potential of fare increases is considerable,
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at least in the short run. 10 The main obstacle to fare increases has
been strong political pressure from riders to maintain low fares.
Assuming such political opposition could be overcome, fare increases
would not be the same for all types of transit services. To the extent
that it is deemed desirable to increase revenues with the minimum loss
of patronage, fare increases should be greatest where demand is least
elastic (for example, peak-hour subway use) and least where demand is
most elastic (off-peak bus use). Such elasticity-related price changes
not only would minimize passenger attrition but would also improve the
equity of transit financing since off-peak riders have significantly lower
incomes than rush-hour riders. For similar reasons, fare increases should
be greater for long transit trips than for short trips. Although empirical
evidence on demand elasticity differences among modes is contradictory,
relatively larger fare hikes on commuter rail and rail rapid transit lines
clearly would yield a more progressive distributional impact than would
uniform increases on all modes. Moreover, since affluent riders are
more sensitive to service changes than are low-income riders, whereas
they are less sensitive to fare changes, it may be appropriate to
upgrade services used by the affluent and to charge them substantially
higher fares but to maintain or lower fares for poor riders while curtail-
ing somewhat the quality of their service.
Revenues, of course, can also be increased by attracting more passen-
gers. By far the most powerful method of diverting travelers to transit
is to increase substantially the cost of automobile use. Indeed, empirical
studies suggest that the level of transit use is strikingly more sensitive
to automobile operating costs than it is to transit fares. 1 1 Thus,
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increasing bridge tolls, gasoline taxes, and auto registration fees and
excise taxes; imposing roadway pricing on congested arteries; and reduc-
ing the supply of parking (or increasing its cost) could potentially
augment transit ridership to virtually any degree desired. Moreover,
the proceeds of these taxes and user charges could be made available for
use in transit subsidization. However powerful these auto pricing measures
are in theory, they are very unpopular among voters, and attempts to imple-
ment them have so far been unsuccessful. If perchance these measures
were, in fact, implemented, the net distributional impact would probably
be progressive because automobile users have higher incomes, on average,
than do the transit users who would benefit from such cross-subsidization.
Although transit operating subsidies will surely increase more slowly
over the coming years, it is unlikely that they, like capital subsidies,
will actually decrease in magnitude. It is also unlikely that the response
to this slower growth will be dramatically different from what has been
observed in New York. Fares will be revised somewhat, frequency of service
will be reduced, and some very unprofitable routes will be eliminated.
Labor wages and fringe benefits will continue to grow, but at a reduced
rate, and minor gains in productivity will be made. It is also likely
that, as in New Yorktransit operations will remain in a state of fiscal
crisis. Improvements in transit financing and operations discussed above
would undoubtedly avert such a crisis, but there does not appear to be
sufficient political support for their implementation.
Future Progressivity of the Transit Program
The overall distribution of transit subsidy benefits will probably
become more progressive as a result of government-imposed fiscal austerity.
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Reduced subsidization of capital investment in rail rapid transit systems
will certainly diminish benefits to the affluent. Redistributive shifts
arising from the slower growth of operating subsidies will probably be
less substantial in magnitude but should also increase overall progres-
sivity. Reducing benefits to transit workers, instituting peak-hour pricing
and distance-related fares, and curtailing commuter rail service, for
example, would all work in this direction.
The progressivity of transit tax financing, however, might diminish
unless savings in Federal capital subsidy funds were shifted in some degree
to use for operating subsidization. Otherwise, regressive state and local
taxation, which currently dominates the financing of operating subsidies,
would offset the progressive Federal financing of capital subsidies, which
would be significantly reduced in magnitude. Provided that strict and
enforceable guidelines on productivity and cost control accompany increased
Federal operating subsidies, such a shift from capital subsidization to
operating subsidization would significantly increase the overall progressiv-
ity of the transit program.
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state and local share was estimated by assuming a one-third share until
1974 and one-fifth since then. (A number of different matching shares
were in effect for the various components of the D.C. Metro and BART
programs.) Note that the special Metro and BART categories do not
include either Section 3 or Interstate Funds which were used for construc-
tion of these systems. The cumulative data were the most recent available
in each category. The Section 3 and Interstate Transfer figures cover the
period ending 6/30/77. The Section 5 capital grant figures are through
3/30/77. The Urban Systems figures are through 9/30/76. And the special
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appropriations for the D.C. Metrorail system are through 9/30/77. At
least some portion of the unmatched BART funds was assembled prior to
1965, but all other categories of aid relate to the totals since the
1965 Federal Fiscal year.
3 Ibid.
4BART Passenger Profile Survey, Official Bay Area Guide, San Francisco,
December 1975 cited in Hoachlander, Bay Area Rapid Transit: Who Pays and
Who Benefits? University of California, Institute of Urban and Regional
Development, Berkeley, Working Paper-267, July 1976.
5Hoachlander, p. 35; Melvin Webber, "The Failure of BART," Public
Interest, Fall 1976, p. 79-108.
6The income categories of the 1970 NPTS survey, as reported in
Table 2.1 above, were adjusted in a very approximate manner to render
them comparable with 1975 data on BART rider incomes. Each category
endpoint was inflated by 50% to account for the 50% growth in personal
income since 1970. This adjustment is valid, of course, only if the
relative income distribution of riders remained the same, which fragmentary
evidence appears to confirm. (Tristate Planning Commission, "A Decade of
Change . . ."). Even with the adjustment, however, the income categories
are differently bracketted, so that further manipulation is required.
If interpolation is used to readjust the BART distribution--in the simplest
manner conceivable--to conform to the NPTS brackets, one obtains the
following hypothetical distributions:
Percent of Percent of Old
Income BART Riders Rapid Transit Riders
Under $4,500 8.4% 6.7%
$4,500- $8,999 17.3 19.8
$9,000-$14,999 25.8 30.2
$15,000-$22,499 23 21.1
$22,500 or more 25.4 21.1
7The BART system currently carries less than 3% of the national total,
and the other new systems are being built on a considerably smaller scale.
Pucher,' "Losses in the American Transit Industry," Table 2-3-3.
8The figures in this table are based on Tables 4.2 and 2.1 and the
adjusted BART distribution in Footnote 6 above.
9Transit Operating Report.
122
Chapter 5
1Calculated on the basis of Tables 3.5 and 4.3. The 2 lowest income
categories in these tables have been disaggregated here to 3 to provide
somewhat finer detail for assessing the impact of the subsidies at the lower
end of the income spectrum.
2 Budget of the U.S. Government, FY 1978, Appendix, p. 281; Melvin
Webber, "BART Outcomes: An Early Appraisal," Monograph No. 26, Institute
of Urban and Regional Development and Institute of Transportation Studies,
University of California, Berkeley, October 1976. Additional, unpublished
cost projections were obtained from Russ Scoville of the WMATA Grant
Division of UMTA and the WMATA transportation planning department.
3Webber, "BART Outcomes"; Jack Faucett Associates, "A Study of Alterna-
tive Metrorail Systems"; Andrew Hamer, The Selling of Rail Rapid Transit,
Lexington, Mass. , Heath-Lexington, 1975.
4Hamer, Selling; Martin Wohl, "An Analysis and Evaluation of the
Rapid Transit Extension to Cleveland's Airport," Urban Institute, Working
Paper No. 704-43, Washington, D.C., January, 1972; Meyer, Kain, and Wohl,
The Urban Transportation Problem, Cambridge, Harvard University Press,
1965, p. 171-306.
5Motor Vehicle Manufacturer's Association, Motor Vehicle Facts and
Figures, 1977, p. 38.
Chapter 6
The 83% figure was roughly calculated on the basis of the relative
importance of the Interstate Transfer program, as reflected in Table 4.1.
2These aggregate figures are based on funding statistics obtained
from transportation agencies in each of the 26 largest U.S. metropolitan
areas. Funding statistics for each of these individual cities can be
found in Pucher, "Transit Financing," Table 3-1.
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
5UMTA, "Transit Operating Performance," p. 10.
6 Calculated on the basis of Table 3-2 in Pucher, "Transit Operating
Subsidies"; Tables B.1 and B.2. in Appendix B; Crowell, "Financing Mass
Transit in New York City," Council on the Environment of New York City,
New York, October 1975, pp. 36-56; and Musgrave and Musgrave, Public
Finance in Theory and Practice, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1972, p. 366.
123
Chapter 7
IRichard Musgrave, Karl Case, and Herman Leonard, "The Distribution
of Fiscal Burdens and Benefits," Public Finance Quarterly, July 1974; a
summary of this study appears in Richard Musgrave and Peggy Musgrave,
Public Finance in Theory and Practice, New York, McGraw Hill, 1973, p.
365-377.
2Musgrave and Musgrave, Public Finance, p. 367.
3Musgrave and Musgrave, Public Finance, p. 368.
4Musgrave and Musgrave, Public Finance, p. 370.
5See text for a description of how this table was constructed.
6 Pucher, "Transit Subsidies," Table 3-2.
Chapter 8
Based on Table 5.1 and Table 7.3.
2Based on calculations made from NPTS computer tape by the author.
3See Table 2.6.
4Federal Highway Administration, Nationwide Personal Transportation
Study, Report No. 8, p. 65.
5See Figure 3.4.
6See Tables 3.1 and 6.3.
7Urban Mass Transportation Administration, "Cuyulative Capital Grants
by Mode and Urbanized Area, 2-1-65 Through 9-30-76," unpublished report.
Chapter 9
IPucher, "Income Characteristics," Table 1-2.
2 Transit Fact Book, p. 22, 23; Figure 4.1 above; and discussions with
officials in the Policy Analysis Division of UMTA.
3,
"Transcript of the President's Address on Inflation," New York Times,
April 12, 1978, p. 34, col. 2.
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4 Unpublished memorandum from Ralph E. Rechel of the Institute for
Public Administration to Bruce McDowell of the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations and Kenneth Cook of the Transportation
Research Board, September 25, 1977.
5See Figures 3.3 above.
6Meyer, et al., Urban Transportation Problem, esp. Ch. 8-11; Webber,
"The BART Experience"; Homer, The Selling of Rail Rapid Transit.
7The estimate of 1/2 is based on the current use of capital subsidies
and the fact that recent expenditures for vehicle replacement and right-
of-way maintenance are abnormally high due to decades of neglect.
8Pucher, "Transit Operating Losses," Tables 2-2-1 through 2-2-8.
9Meyer and Gomez-Ibanez, "Productivity Growth and Labor Relations
in Mass Transit."
10 Pucher and Rothenberg, "Pricing in Urban Transportation: A Survey
of Empirical Evidence on the Elasticity of Travel Demand," MIT Center
for Transportation Studies, September, 1976, p. 61.
11Pucher and Rothenberg, p. 48-49.
APPENDIX A: MEASURING THE UTILITY IMPACTS OF TRANSIT SUBSIDIES
Measuring utility impacts primarily involves estimating the relevant
demand curve and then, on the basis of this curve, calculating consumer
surplus as the area under the demand curve less the product of the price
actually charged and the quantity purchased.
In the case of transit subsidies, one would proceed in the following
manner: First, it would be necessary to determine the actual impacts of
transit subsidies in terms of fare reductions or service improvements.
For reasons discussed in Chapter 1, it was not possible to decompose the
impacts of subsidization comprehensively on a nationwide basis. If such
decomposition had been possible, however, the next step would have been
to examine the demand for travel.
A demand equation for each mode of transit would be estimated for
each income group. Further disaggregation, moreover, would be required to
account for the substantial differences in the nature of demand and quality
of service at different times of day and on different portions of the system
(for example, inner-city vs. suburban). At a minimum, this would involve
the estimation of about 30 different equations. Each of these equations,
of course, would have to incorporate the effect on demand of fares, service
levels (dependability, speed, frequency, comfort, safety--especially from
crime) and all other factors thatmi-ght significantly affect the level of
transit use (for example, the level and relative concentration of employment
and residence, the quality and extent of the urban highway network, the
level of auto ownership, the effective price of auto use--including
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insurance costs, parking charges, fuel costs, and roadway tolls). Given
this set of estimated equations and the precise fare and service changes
that are attributable to subsidization, one could calculate the consumer
surpluses that have accrued to each income group as a result of the subsidies.
Of course, data are not available for such an ideal estimation.
Nevertheless, at least one study has attempted to use crude elasticity
estimates to calculate the aggregate consumer surplus of fare changes in
New York City. Average fare elasticities of -.31 for bus use and -.16 for
subway use were calculated on the basis of monthly ridership, fare, service,
and demographic data from 1950 to 1974. Using these average elasticity
figures, very simplifed demand curves for bus and subway use were extra-
polated from current base fare and ridership levels.*
On the basis of the estimated demand equations, it was calculcated
that in 1975, with fares at 35$, the total consumer surplus accruing to
transit riders in New York was $1.4 billion. The consumer surplus per sub-
way trip was $1.09, almost twice the surplus of a bus trip ($.56). It was
projected that increasing fares from 354 to 75t would have reduced ponsumer
surplus by $430 million but would have increased total fare revenues by
$370 million. Conversely, reducing fares to 25t would have increased
consumer surplus by $150 million and would have reduced revenues by $125
million. Thus, the changes in consumer surplus arising from the hypothetical
fare alterations were estimated to be only slightly greater than the
corresponding changes in fare revenues.
*Transit use was estimated as a function of fare only, assuming that
other explanatory variables remained unchanged.
**The consumer surplus associated with any given fare level is approxi-
mated by the total area under the demand curve up to the level of ridership
at that fare (i.e. the total utility derived from that level of transit use)
12:7
Unfortunately, there are a number of theoretical and measurement
problems associated with these consumer surplus estimates that detract
from their accuracy and usefulness. These limitations are especially signi-
ficant for the distributional analysis of the present study. First, an
average elasticity figure is used although it is quite likely that the
actual fare elasticity would vary at different price levels, particularly
for substantial fare changes. Second, the consumer surplus calculations
assume that the income effect of fare changes is zero--that is, that the
change in effective purchasing power resulting from the fare change is
insignificant relative to a household's total budget. Clearly, this is
not a reasonable assumption for low-income households that depend heavily
on mass transit. Finally, the study calculates an aggregate consumer
surplus for all income classes; the benefit impact is not decomposed by
income class. To do so, a separate demand function must be estimated for
each class.
Even assuming that fully disaggregate demand functions could be
esti.mated for each income class, the consumer surplus estimates made on
the basis of these functions would not be comparable unless the marginal
utility of income across income groups were equal. In fact, society
implicitly deems a dollar of income received by a poor household to
produce greater utility or benefit than the same dollar received by an
affluent household. This presumably is the justification for welfare
programs and progressive taxation. The only way out of this morass is to
assign arbitrary weights to the consumer surplus figures of different
less an area equal to fare revenues. The change in consumer surplus attribut-
able to a fare change, therefore, equals the difference in areas under the
demand curve arising from different ridership at different prices, less the
difference in fare revenues.
12.8
incomel groups. But then, the calculated overall distributional impacts
of the program would be the result almost entirely of the arbitrarily
chosen weights. In short, aside from the practical problems of measurement,
consumer surplus analysis is of almost no use at all in determining the
distribution of transit subsidy benefits.
4
NOTES TO APPENDIX A
IWilliam Crowell, An Analysis of Transit Finance and Pricing Options,
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1977, esp. p. 39-51.
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APPENDIX B: TAX REVENUE COMPOSITION FOR SELECTED STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Table B.I. Tax Revenue Sources for Local Governments in Selected
Metropolitan Areas (Percent of Total Tax Revenue, Excluding
Governmental Transfers)l
% Property % Property
City Tax City Tax
New York 50 Minneapolis-St. Paul 96
Boston 99 Kansas City 78
Philadelphia 69 Atlanta 88
Baltimore 70 Miami 80
Washington, D.C. 54 New Orleans 48
Buffalo 82 Houston 87
Cleveland 82 Dallas 86
Detroit 89 Denver 77
Chicago 87 San Diego 88
Milwaukee 99 Los Angeles 87
Pittsburgh 78 San Francisco 86
Cincinnati 75 Portland 95
St. Louis 76 Seattle 82
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Table B.2 Tax Revenue Sources for Selected States
(Percent og Total Tax Revenue, Excluding Intergovernmental
Transfers)
Type of Tax
State
Sales Personal Income Property
New York 41 36 0
Massachusetts 38 41 0
New Jersey 67 1 4
Connecticut 70 6 0
Pennsylvania 51 19 0
Maryland 47 36 3
Virginia 39 18 28
District of Columbia 33 30 31
Ohio 69 5 3
Michigan 51 24 3
Illinois 59 25 0
Wisconsin 43 30 5
Minnesota 44 36 0
Missouri 57 24 0
Georgia 67 20 0
Florida 76 0 4
Louisiana 50 10 3
Texas 70 0 2
Colorado 54 29 0
California 50 27 4
Oregon 24 49 0
Washington 79 0 11
NOTES TO APPENDIX B
ICalculated on the basis of data in the 1972 Census of Governments,
Local Government in Metropolitan Areas, Vol. 5, Table 12, p. 263.
2Calculated on the basis of data in the 1972 Census of Governments,
Census of Governments, Government Finances, Vol. 4, No. 5, Table 46,
p. 122.
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